Wang Miao and Professor Shipeng Yan
7 October 2026
On 26 November 2025, an unprecedented fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po drew widespread attention from all sectors of society. In addition to the full-scale efforts of various government departments, including the Fire Services Department, and social welfare agencies, enterprises quickly stepped in as another important force in disaster relief. It was reported that, as of 15 December 2025, more than 320 A-share-listed and Hong Kong-listed enterprises had worked with the Government and non-profit organizations to donate for disaster relief, with contributions totalling approximately HK$3 billion, thereby providing solid material support for reconstruction efforts.
As market entities with substantial resources and professional capabilities, what role do enterprises play in post-disaster reconstruction?
From donating money to contributing capabilities
Corporate philanthropy has long been regarded as an add-on activity following profit distribution: enterprises first generate profits and then return a portion of them to society. In 1991, management scholar Archie B. Carroll proposed the concept of the “pyramid of corporate social responsibility”, placing philanthropy at the apex of the pyramid and emphasizing its voluntary nature (see Note 1). Since then, discussions of corporate philanthropy have gradually shifted from “whether to donate” to “how to create greater social value”. In 2002, Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer published an article in the Harvard Business Review, arguing that enterprises should align their philanthropic investments with their distinctive capabilities and competitive context, thereby making corporate expertise a means of giving back to society (see Note 2).
Enterprises as key participants in disaster relief
During the No. 5 alarm fire, enterprises’ actions vividly illustrated this paradigm shift in social responsibility. According to my research, 140 enterprises deployed capabilities closely related to their core businesses for disaster relief, accounting for nearly half of the enterprises involved in the relief effort. Spanning around eight industries, these companies mobilized resources that were highly diverse and specialized. On the day after the tragic fire, SF Express swiftly opened all 146 of its service points across Hong Kong to transport relief supplies free of charge, putting its logistics network directly to use in disaster relief (see Note 3). In addition to donating HK$20 million, Sun Hung Kai Properties opened 160 transitional housing units to provide temporary accommodation for affected residents (see Note 4). Three hotels under Guangdong Holdings Limited also voluntarily made guest rooms available, accommodating more than 178 stays by affected residents, while also allocating supplies including 1,000 cartons of milk and 500 chairs with backrests (see Note 5).
The government and specialized social organizations have traditionally been the principal actors in disaster relief, while enterprises have remained on the periphery of the conventional relief system, participating mainly through donations of funds and essential supplies. With the deepening division of labour in the modern economy, however, an increasing number of key urban resources and specialized capabilities have taken root within enterprises. As a result, enterprises are gradually shifting from being donors to becoming central nodes in the disaster relief system, forming a complementary relationship with traditional charitable actors. Studies have shown that, in sudden disasters, the participation of local enterprises is conducive to relief efforts. When corporate assistance accounts for a relatively high proportion of relief work, the overall social recovery of disaster-affected areas over the following decade is significantly better than that of areas with lower levels of corporate participation, demonstrating the distinctive advantages of corporate involvement in disaster relief (see Note 6). My preliminary analysis finds that this difference in capabilities is also reflected in capital markets: enterprises that specifically explain in their announcements how they deploy their specialized capabilities subsequently receive more positive stock market reactions.
Institutionalization potential under sudden pressure
Although many enterprises possess unique and substantial disaster relief resources, not all of them have a disaster response mechanism capable of responding in a timely manner. According to my figures, the average response time of enterprises after the fire was 3.6 days, with more than half able to take swift action within two days. Still, their responses varied significantly. Some enterprises were able to complete decision-making, mobilize personnel, and deliver resources to the disaster-affected areas within a few hours, while others were slow to reach internal consensus or take action.
This difference reflects whether an enterprise has a clear emergency authorization mechanism, whether its key resources can be deployed across departments, and whether different business units have prior experience in coordination. Efficient disaster relief measures cannot be improvised at the last minute; they must be built on organizational routines and learning mechanisms accumulated over time through ongoing business operations.
China Merchants Group is exemplary in this regard. In 2014, to meet the emergency logistics needs of disaster response, the Group established the “Relief Supplies Express” logistics platform. Leveraging the strength of its logistics and transportation business network, it has worked closely with relief organizations in disaster-affected areas and has responded on multiple occasions to public emergency transportation needs, including during the Sichuan earthquake, urban flooding, and COVID-19 prevention and control. Drawing on its extensive practical experience, “Relief Supplies Express” has developed a mature disaster relief mechanism. During the Tai Po fire, the programme enabled China Merchants Group to become one of the fastest-responding enterprises, opening up a cross-border channel for transporting supplies from the Mainland to Hong Kong with exceptional efficiency (see Note 7).
An enterprise’s rescue capabilities in sudden disasters fully reveal the institutionalized capabilities it has developed over the long term. Such capabilities may normally be highly latent: they may not necessarily be explicitly reflected in corporate social responsibility investments, and they are also difficult to identify from environmental, social, and governance reports. Once a crisis occurs, however, the long-accumulated differences among organizations quickly become apparent. Therefore, an enterprise’s actions are merely a projection of its enduring capabilities under extreme circumstances, and the boundaries of those capabilities have largely been defined by the structure of its day-to-day operations.
How enterprises contribute to urban resilience
The fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po clearly demonstrates the potential of enterprises to transform commercial assets into public value. To solidify this potential into stable and sustainable urban resilience, it is essential to continuously improve enterprises’ internal capability-building and external collaboration mechanisms.
First, enterprises should have a stable resource base. My research finds that enterprises with more ample operating cash flow, stronger profitability, and lower leverage are more likely to make decisions to provide relief earlier. Therefore, the financial flexibility and resource reserves developed through day-to-day operations directly affect the scope for action available to companies during a crisis. Second, enterprises should identify in advance their own mobilization capabilities in public crises, and review and update this assessment as their businesses change. By doing so, they can form clear expectations for action before a crisis occurs and reduce the time costs of reassessing and reallocating resources after a disaster. Finally, enterprises should establish regularized coordination channels with the government and social organizations to reduce resource misallocation, duplicative investment, and mismatches between supply and demand, thereby ensuring that corporate resources are precisely aligned with frontline needs.
Such a collaborative model has already begun to take shape. In 2026, the Hong Kong Council of Social Service established the Tai Po Fire Resource Matching Platform to promote resource integration, with plans to further connect supply chain, logistics, and business partners (see Note 8). This post-fire exploration can also serve as a starting point for institutional preparedness.
The shift from “donating money” to “contributing capabilities” changes not only the practice of corporate social responsibility, but also the general logic by which a city responds to risk. How to enable the commercial capabilities dispersed throughout the market to be transformed rapidly and systematically into public emergency response capabilities when a crisis occurs may be the lesson most worthy of deep reflection and practice by Hong Kong after the disaster.
Note 1: https://doi.org/10.1016/0007-6813(91)90005-G
Note 2:https://hbr.org/2002/12/the-competitive-advantage-of-corporate-philanthropy
Note 3:https://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/2025-11-27/doc-infyvthc0830274.shtml
Note 4:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/GZhRGcrwvXm-FNg73vE6-g
Note 5:https://www.wenweipo.com/a/202512/06/AP69344306e4b019322230b647.html
Note 6:https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0765
Note 7:https://www.cmcf.org.cn/content/2160
Note 8:https://www.hkcss.org.hk/hkcss-support-for-tai-po-fire-incident/?lang=en







