Platform Bias Creates Barriers to Digital Innovations

Digital platforms help lesser-known cultural workers find their audience by reducing consumers’ search costs, allowing products that struggle in traditional markets to enter at lower costs, thereby fostering a more diverse marketplace. However, as traffic becomes increasingly important, operations of digital platforms are becoming more biased. In China’s digital arts and entertainment market, the platform’s…


Having closely examined Mainland China’s online car-hailing market, it is clear that aggregation platforms like Amap Taxi are on the rise. A driver who recently entered the car-hailing industry told me that some of the self-operated, traditional platforms discriminate against newly joined drivers. This means newbies end up being assigned with less profitable orders while drivers who have been on the platform longer are given better rides. This is why drivers with less history on a platform prefer to get work from aggregation ride-hailing platforms. In fact, biases in these platforms are common, as it could be due to the platform’s market position. It may also be down to the relationship between platforms and manufacturers, including how their profits are split. As long as the platforms have a certain level of monopoly power, it is inevitable that the platform will be biased. A crucial question is whether this bias will dull the motivation of manufacturers and harm consumer interests?

One related issues caused a stir just a few years ago. On Amazon, the US-based global leading online shopping platform, hosts many third-party sellers. The debate was whether Amazon should be banned from selling products similar to those of its third-party vendors. Those for this argument think promotions on Amazon significantly impact a seller’s business. If Amazon is allowed to sell its own similar products, the platform directs more traffic to its own products, which then suppresses third-party goods. This favouritism undoubtedly distorts the platform’s ecology, trampling over the grassroots economy formed by small and medium-sized vendors (Note 1).

Defenders of Amazon point to the high costs in building a popular ecosystem. In this regard, they believe the platform should be allowed to make adjustments to commercialise and capitalise on online traffic. They suggest that the platform could even sign contracts with third-party sellers and provide them with support. On most shopping platforms, products are mainly differentiated by their quality and the innovation element being a smaller consideration. In these cases, platform bias does not raise skewed results. When it comes to creative products, however, vertical differentiation is critical. The success of one seller will create anxiety among competitors so the disruption of platform bias is evident.

The most typical example of a platform market with vertically differentiated and highly innovative products is in digital cultural products, such as music, film, television, and literary works. Renowned industrial economist Joel Waldfogel published “Digital Renaissance: What Data and Economics Tell Us about the Future of Popular Culture.”

Published in 2018, the book praised how digital platforms encourage grassroots innovations. Waldfogel, who is also a professor at the University of Minnesota, put forward the view that digital platforms drastically reduce consumers’ search costs and the cost of introducing new products into the market. Some of the products that few people show interest in in traditional markets could find a niche customer base on a digital platform (Note 2). Such an ecosystem offers favourable conditions for a diversified market, giving budding and creative workers an opportunity to make a name for themselves. This could also revive literary and artistic gems that previously went unnoticed.

I invited Professor Waldfogel to visit China last year. We had in-depth discussion on issues surrounding digital renaissance. When he was writing his book, cultural digital platforms were operating in a more “passive” manner with the main goal of matching consumers and manufacturers. In the past decade, however, platforms have been operating in an increasingly proactive manner. This is particularly true in China’s digital art and entertainment market, where a platform’s push and manipulation can dictate the fate of a creative product. When it is often stated that online traffic is king, the idea of beating the odds with little online interest is a myth. This shows that platform bias can make or break a market and control industry innovation.

Together with Professor Feng Zhu of Harvard Business School, we examined platform bias in Chinese platforms for web novels. The majority of web novel platforms offer two contracts with authors. One is where the platform buys out the work. The other is where profits are split between the platform and author. The first resembles a self-operating mode and the latter is akin to a third-party seller. This is why platforms tend to direct more web traffic to web novels they have acquired.

If creative works are sold off to platforms, revenues are then disassociated from the quality of the novels. As such, many authors choose to take a step back, give up new ideas and simply cater to what readers want. In other words, novels that are favoured by the platforms lack creativity. Our research paper uses a large volume of micro data to illustrate how this conflict plays out in an increasingly competitive market and its impact on consumers as well as innovations in the industry (Note 3).

Getting digital platforms to allocate their resources reasonably through a well-designed mechanism has become an important topic in platform-economy research. Short-term profits often turn into long-term obstacles for platforms. Authorities should protect consumers’ rights by regulating the platforms’ conduct for short-term gains. Digital platforms should also seek to strike a balance between their short and long-term interests to ensure a healthy development of platform economy.

Note 1: Feng Zhu and Qihong Liu, “Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com,” Strategic Management Journal, Volume 39, Number 10 (2018), 2618-2642

Note 2: Joel Waldfogel, Digital Renaissance: What Data and Economics Tell Us about the Future of Popular Culture, (Princeton University Press, 2018)

Note 3: Yanhui Wu and Feng Zhu, “Competition, Contracts, and Creativity: Evidence from Novel Writing in a Platform Market”, Management Science Volume 68, Issue 12 (December 2022), 8613-8634

Professor Yanhui Wu
Professor of Economics
Professor of Management and Strategy

This article was also published on November 14, 2024 on the Financial Times’ Chinese website

Translation

數字平台有偏見 草根經濟難創新


從近期中國內地網約車市場中,明顯看到像高德打車這一類聚合平台的崛起。一位入行不久的司機告訴我,一些自營模式的傳統平台歧視新手,給他們派的都是掙錢少的差單,好單則留給在平台工作已久的老司機,因此他們這些新司機,更喜歡在聚合打車平台接單。其實,平台偏心的現象,比比皆是。這可能是平台的市場定位造成,又或者由平台與廠商之間的利益分配關係釀成。只要擁有一定的壟斷權力,平台難免有偏見。關鍵的問題是,這種偏見是否會打擊廠商積極性,幷損害消費者的利益?

與此相關的一個議題,便是幾年前一度鬧得沸沸揚揚,有關亞馬遜這樣容納衆多第三方賣家的購物平台,應否禁止其銷售跟第三方賣家相近的産品。這個議題的提出者認爲,亞馬遜平台的推廣對賣家銷售起著舉足輕重的作用。若允許自營,平台一定會把更多流量分給自家産品,打壓第三方産品。如此厚此薄彼,勢必扭曲整個平台的生態,壓抑由中小賣家組成的草根經濟【注 1】。亞馬遜的辯護者則稱,平台構建生態聚集人氣的成本很高,應當允許其適度將流量商業化、資本化,而第三方賣家可以與平台簽訂合約,獲取平台的支持。在典型的購物平台上,商品的差异主要是水平差异,創新成分不明顯,所以平台偏見不會有顛覆性的結果。但對于創造性的産品,其差异主要是垂直差异,一家歡喜則意味另一家憂,平台偏見的殺傷力也就大不一樣。

産品垂直差异化、創新程度高的平台市場,最典型的例子就是數字文化産品,包括音樂、影視,乃至文藝作品。知名産業經濟學者、美國明尼蘇達大學教授Joel Waldfogel在2018年出版一本熱情洋溢的書,名爲《數字文藝復興》,禮贊數字平台對鼓勵草根創新的正面作用。他的觀點是,數字平台大大降低消費者的搜索成本,以及新産品進入市場的成本。一些在傳統市場乏人問津的長尾産品,在數字平台上却能很快找到知音,鎖定消費群【注 2】。這樣的生態有利于百花齊放,尤其讓知名度不高、但創造性强的文化工作者提供异軍突起的機會,而過去給埋沒的文藝寶石也可能復興。

筆者去年邀請Waldfogel教授到中國訪問,特別就數字文藝復興的問題與他進行探討。在他寫這本書的時候,文化數字平台的運營方式相對“消極”,主要目的是撮合消費者和生産者。但過去十年,平台運營日趨主動化,特別是在中國的數字文藝娛樂市場,平台的推送和操縱基本决定一部作品的命運。所謂流量爲王,能够逆“流”改命純屬神話。在這種情况下,平台的偏見便會主宰市場沉浮,决定産業創新。

筆者和哈佛大學商學院的朱峰教授以中國的網絡小說平台爲案例,研究了這個議題。在大多數的網絡小說平台,作者跟平台簽約有兩種方式:一種是平台買斷作品,另一種是作者與平台分成作品帶來的收益。前者接近平台自營模式,後者雷同第三方賣家,所以平台傾向于對其買斷的産品提供更多的流量扶持。若然把作品賣斷給平台,市場收益跟産品質量脫鈎,很多作者就選擇躺平,只迎合讀者口味灌水,放弃創新。也就是說,平台偏心的作品反而創新不够。我們的論文通過大量的微觀數據,展示這個矛盾如何在市場競爭加劇的情况下演變,以及對消費者和産業創新的影響【注 3】

如何通過合理的機制設計來促使數字平台合理分配資源,已經成爲平台經濟研究的一個重要課題。平台短期獲益的行爲,往往成爲長期活力的阻礙。監管部門不僅要爲保護消費者權益來限制短期獲益的行爲,數字平台自身也要平衡好長短期的利益,才能促進平台經濟的良性發展。

【注 1】: Feng Zhu and Qihong Liu, “Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon. com,” Strategic Management Journal, Volume 39, Number 10 (2018), 2618–2642
【注 2】:Joel Waldfogel, Digital Renaissance: What Data and Economics Tell Us about the Future of Popular Culture, (Princeton University Press, 2018)
【注 3】:Yanhui Wu and Feng Zhu, “Competition, Contracts, and Creativity: Evidence from Novel Writing in a Platform Market”, Management Science Volume 68, Issue 12 (December 2022), 8613-8634

吳延暉教授
港大經管學院經濟學、管理及商業策略副教授

(本文同時於二零二四年十一月十四日載於《FT中文網》「明德商論」專欄)