Three Key Challenges and Four Strategic Solutions for the Hong Kong Economy

Hong Kong’s economy is facing a series of significant challenges, including an ongoing fiscal deficit, not being able to fully leverage the composite advantages of the Greater Bay Area, a shrinking middle class, and a drain of international talent.


Professor Heiwai Tang and Mr Cyrus Cheung

18 December 2024

 

Through the ebb and flow of its economy in the aftermath of the Second World War, Hong Kong has sealed its status as an international financial and trade centre on the world’s economic stage. However, in light of the global economic downturn, fierce regional competition, and worsening geopolitical situation in recent years, coupled with the fact that Hong Kong–as a highly externally-oriented free economy–cannot afford to be complacent simply because it has historically managed to turn crises into opportunities. Times have changed. Now beleaguered by internal problems such as an ageing population as well as external challenges, the city may no longer be as “hardy” as it once was.

To address the challenges in the new era, Hongkongers should not stick to the old rut and must find ways to enhance competitiveness so that long-standing and thorny problems can be resolved.

 

Formidable problems facing the economy

The first challenge facing the Hong Kong economy over the past few years is the SAR Government’s persistent fiscal deficits. After racking up a record-high surplus of $149 billion for 2017–18, the Government registered a fiscal deficit of $100.2 billion for 2023–24. Initially projected to be downsized to $48.1 billion for the current year 2024–25, the deficit is now estimated to reach $100 billion. Barring the reduction in income from Government-issued bonds, the actual deficit would be even larger. Factors underlying the deficits include fast-increasing government expenditures as well as decline in government revenues. Government expenditure soared significantly from $470.9 billion for 2017–18 to $721.3 billion for 2023–24, of which non-recurrent, social welfare, and healthcare expenditures grew the fastest. The last two items are unlikely to be cut. Meanwhile, government revenue dropped from $619.8 billion to $549.4 billion.

The Figure shows that in 2017–18, 26.6% of the Government’s main sources of revenue came from land premium while 15.4% came from stamp duties. In 2023–24, the share of land premium plummeted to 3.6% and stamp duties dramatically slumped to 8.9%. Despite seeing its share rise from 3.5% to 13.6%, investment income is, after all, not a stable source of revenue. In addition, the Inland Revenue Department annual report 2023–24 reveals that in the year of assessment 2022–23, only around 1.83 million people were required to pay salaries tax, which means that the tax base is still narrow. Given the overall economic downturn, it is unlikely that the Government will be able to sharply reduce the persistently-high fiscal deficits in the short run.

 

Figure    Sources of the Hong Kong SAR Government revenue for 2017–18 and 2023–24

 

The second challenge facing the Hong Kong economy is the failure to fully leverage the economic benefits from the integrated development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA). Despite the high degree of integration of consumption activities in the GBA, Hong Kong’s professional services sector has yet to be fully integrated into the development of the GBA. While it has become a trend among Hongkongers to go north for spending, there is much less incentive for Mainlanders to spend in Hong Kong. At the same time, more and more local people prefer to shop on Mainland e-commerce platforms, inevitably impacting the sales of physical stores in Hong Kong. According to the Census and Statistics Department’s data, the Value Index of Retail Sales dropped from 144.8 points in 2018 to merely 121.3 points in 2023 while the monthly average for the first 10 months of 2024 went further down to 111.8 points.

Furthermore, the Volume Index of Retails Sales dropped from 148.9 points in 2018 to 113.9 points in 2023, and even averaged 103.3 points in the first 10 months of 2024. The decreases for both indexes are equally significant. Due to constraints in rent and labour costs, the local retail industry can hardly compete with its Mainland counterpart in terms of cost-effectiveness. It seems that the professional services industry, in which Hong Kong excels, has not been able to capitalize on the market opportunities in the GBA. This can be put down not only to the sluggish macroeconomy in recent years but also to delayed cross-boundary professional qualification certification, administrative red tape, and other factors.

The third challenge facing the Hong Kong economy is the gradual shrinking of the middle class and international talent drain. Hong Kong’s unitary economic structure is one of the primary reasons for the weakening middle class. Since middle-income jobs have always been concentrated in the financial, real estate, and professional services industries, problems will start to surface as soon as these sectors face headwinds. In addition, while there has been a mass migration of middle-class families overseas in the last few years, the highly-educated new immigrants to Hong Kong are less internationalized. The LinkedIn profile data analysed in an essay in the “Hong Kong Economic Policy Green Paper 2024” published by the HKU Business School demonstrates that the proportion of Asians among leavers is 58% and is as high as 79% among joiners, while the number of connections of leavers is 1.7 times that of joiners.

 

Four reform strategies to chart a new course

Cracking the above problems is no easy task. Let me outline below four policy directions to spark more valuable ideas from all sectors.

  1. Broadening the tax base to tap new revenue sources

Hong Kong can take a leaf from Singapore’s book and consider introducing consumption tax progressively to relieve financial pressure on the Government. The goods and services tax (GST) implemented in Singapore at a rate of 3% in 1994 gradually rose to 9% in 2024. In 2023, the GST contributed to 15.7% of Singapore’s fiscal revenue. Based on private consumption expenditure in Hong Kong, and after deducting existing overlapping tax items, a 2% GST can bring the Hong Kong SAR Government an incremental income of $27 billion, roughly equivalent to 5% of the financial revenue in 2023. Referencing Singapore’s experience, retail sales fell following upward adjustments of GST in 2007 and 2023, but not after GST hikes in 1994, 2003, and 2004. An economist at RHB Bank points out in a recent study that the GST increase in January 2024 did not have a strong impact on Singaporeans’ spending habits. This suggests that a GST rise does not necessarily dampen retail sales. The key lies in a balanced measure that entails controlled tax increases, effective expectations management, and complementary welfare policies to maintain steady consumer sentiment.

As a matter of fact, the introduction of GST in Singapore did arouse controversy. For example, there were views that daily necessities should be exempted. The Singaporean government did not accept this suggestion because of the potential increase in compliance and audit costs. Instead, the authorities chose to alleviate pressure on low-income families by issuing GST vouchers, subsidizing public education and healthcare services, etc. In any case, if the GST rate is set too low, it will not be adequate to alleviate the Government’s financial problems. Conversely, if the rate is set too high, it will breed dissatisfaction among businesses and the general public and could build up excessive inflationary pressure. How to strike a balance in between is a great challenge for policy formulation. Moreover, the Government can consider selling idle assets, including unused premises and surplus equity, to ease financial pressure.

  1. Fostering development via public-private partnerships

The SAR Government can consider strengthening public-private partnerships to promote infrastructure development. Apart from reducing the Government’s initial investment and operating costs, this approach helps to bring in technologies and management experience from leading enterprises. Many international cities have achieved remarkable results through this development mode. Examples include the Chicago Skyway and the Port of Long Beach Middle Harbour Redevelopment Project in the US, the Marina Bay Sands Integrated Resort in Singapore, the Beijing subway Line-4 project, and the Eastern Harbour Crossing in Hong Kong. There are, of course, different forms of public-private partnerships, with “Build, Operate, and Transfer”; “Build, Own, and Operate”; “Transfer, Operate, and Transfer” among the most common modes. Hong Kong can choose the suitable mode depending on its specific needs.

  1. Leveraging unique advantages to integrate into the GBA

Hong Kong needs to optimize its integration with other cities in the GBA to give full play to the benefits of the regional economy. According to the Second Agreement Concerning Amendment to CEPA Agreement on Trade in Services recently signed by the SAR Government with Mainland authorities, the Mainland market will be further opened up to Hong Kong enterprises offering professional services. On this basis, the SAR Government can continue to maintain close liaison and cooperation with other GBA cities to ensure the successful implementation of policies. For instance, assistance can be provided for Hong Kong’s estate surveying companies to complete the filing of records to bid for consultancy services projects in joint ventures within the GBA.

Given the distinct advantage of Hong Kong’s higher education in the GBA, the SAR Government can maintain close cooperation with sister cities and continue to support higher-education institutions in building branch campuses in the GBA and achieving success in their subsequent development. Opening up the “four flows”―human flow, goods flow, capital flow, and information flow―is of vital importance in this regard. Only by doing so will it be possible for the branch campuses in the GBA to obtain invaluable resources from both the Mainland and abroad, and for Hong Kong’s higher education institutions to preserve their competitive edge in internationalization.

To maximize the removal of operating restrictions on Hong Kong’s professional service sectors, such as finance, law, and accounting, in the GBA, the SAR Government needs to continue to lift systemic barriers in the area. For example, in the First Phase Report on Survey of the Current Situation of Hong Kong Legal Practitioners under the Development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, the Law Society of Hong Kong and the School of Law of Sun Yat-sen University point out that under Mainland laws, the associations formed by Hong Kong law firms with Mainland law firms shall not be in the form of partnership or legal entity. Therefore, cooperation between Hong Kong and Mainland law firms is mainly based on non-partnership associations. This gives rise to various problems, including differences in handling conflicts of interest, discrepancies in business acceptance and processing standards, and a lack of clarity on the legal responsibilities of non-partnership associations.

  1. Proactively competing for talent and enticing foreign investments

Apart from talent and capital from the Mainland, Hong Kong must also focus on attracting talent and funds from abroad to maintain its relative advantages as an international metropolis. In view of the fact that the career development of ethnic Chinese technology experts in Europe and the US is thwarted by current geopolitical tensions, the SAR Government should seize this opportunity to encourage them to advance their careers in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the authorities can also consider setting specific performance indicators for local universities, e.g. target percentages for international students, to reinforce local higher education institutions’ strengths in internationalization.

Needless to say, Hong Kong must continue to leverage the unique advantage of “one country, two systems” to draw in more direct foreign investments to the Mainland. At the same time, apart from enticing Mainland investments through the Government’s Office for Attracting Strategic Enterprises, it is also necessary to enhance the presence of leading foreign enterprises to maintain Hong Kong’s distinctive advantage as a bridge to the world. The growth of emerging sectors, e.g. artificial intelligence, biotechnology, financial technology, advanced manufacturing, and new energy sources, will determine if Hong Kong can produce more high-quality jobs in future, thereby expanding its middle class and furthering its economic prosperity.

As we mentioned in this column two years ago, priority should be given to creating a liveable environment when it comes to attracting talent. Otherwise, they will not stay after arriving. On the one hand, they need to find high-quality jobs in Hong Kong, connect with a thriving professional community, and enjoy a comfortable and vibrant living environment. On the other hand, high-quality human capital is a key consideration for companies with an eye to establishing their presence in Hong Kong. Hence, efforts to attract companies and capital, compete for talent, or even formulate cultural policies should be complementary rather than isolated from one another. Retaining talent and businesses is a systemic project that requires comprehensive policy coordination across the SAR Government to achieve success.

 

 

 

Translation
香港經濟自二戰後儘管經歷多次起伏,其國際金融及貿易中心地位,依然在世界經濟舞台上歷久不衰。然而,面對近年全球經濟增長放緩、區域競爭激烈及地緣政治局勢惡化,香港作為高度外向型的自由經濟體,我們不能因為過去均能化危為機便心存僥幸。時移世易,香港現時面對人口老化等諸多內憂,加上外部挑戰,未必如昔日般「耐寒」。

面對這些新時代的挑戰,我們不能因循守舊,必須努力尋找方法提升自身的競爭力,解決經濟的老大難問題。

經濟未解的「老大難」


香港經濟近幾年面對的挑戰之一,是政府財政赤字問題持續。特區政府於2017至2018年度的盈餘達至1490億元,創歷史新高;而在2023/24年度卻錄得1002億元的赤字。本年度(2024至2025)財赤原本預期會縮減至481億元,但目前估計則將高達約1000億元,其中尚未扣除政府發債所得,實際赤字應該更大。財赤的背後,既有政府開支快速增長,亦有政府收入倒退的因素。政府開支在2017/18年度為4709億元;到了2023至2024年度已大幅增至7213億元,當中非經常開支、社福和衛生開支增速較快,而後者並不易扣減。與此同時,特區政府收入從6198億元倒退至5494億元。

如【圖】所示,在政府收入的主要來源中,2017//18年度有26.6%來自賣地、15.4%的收入來自印花稅;到了2023/24年度,賣地收入佔比已銳減至3.6%,而印花稅的佔比則大幅下滑至8.9%。雖然投資收入佔比從3.5%升至13.6%,但始終並非一項穩定的收入來源。此外,稅務局2023/24年報顯示,於2022/23課稅年度只有約183萬市民需要繳交薪俸稅,稅基依然偏小。整體經濟不景,政府難望在短期內大幅削減居高不下的財政赤字。

圖1 香港特區政府於2017-182023-24財年的收入來源



香港經濟面對的挑戰之二,是未能充分發揮粵港澳大灣區融合發展帶來的經濟效益。目前大灣區內的消費活動已經高度融合,但香港的專業服務業仍未能完全融入大灣區的發展。近年港人北上消費成風,但南下旅客消費意欲普遍較弱。同時,愈來愈多港人選擇在內地電商平台購物,對本港實體店的銷量造成一定影響。根據統計處的數據,2018年零售業銷貨價值指數為144.8點,2023年只有121.3點,至2024年首10個月的平均數字進一步跌至111.8點。

此外,2018年零售業銷貨數量指數為148.9點,2023年只有113.9點,至2024年首10個月的平均數字進一步跌至103.3點。兩者降幅同樣顯著。誠言,由於租金和人工成本的約束,香港零售業確實難以在性價比方面與內地同行競爭。但是,香港擅長的專業服務業似乎亦未能充分把握大灣區的市場機遇,這除了是因為近年宏觀經濟轉弱,亦有跨境專業資格認證滯後、行政程序繁瑣等原因。

香港經濟面對的挑戰之三,是中產階層逐漸萎縮、國際人才流失。經濟結構單一是中產階層逐漸萎縮的一大原因,香港中等收入工作一向集中於金融、房地產及專業服務業,當這些行業遭遇逆風,問題便馬上浮現。此外,近年大量中產階層移民海外,雖然亦有大量高學歷的新移民來港,但國際化程度較低。港大經管學院的《香港經濟政策綠皮書2024》曾利用領英數據作出分析,其中亞裔佔離港者的比例為58%,佔來港者的比例卻高達79%;而離港者的聯繫人數目更是來港者的1.7倍。

四大變革邁出新方向


要破解上述問題並非易事,筆者簡列以下四大政策方向,以收拋磚引玉之效。

一、闢財源擴闊稅基

香港可以借鑑新加坡,考慮採用循序漸進的方式引入消費稅,緩解政府財政壓力。新加坡於1994年開徵3%的商品及服務稅(簡稱GST),其後逐步增至2024年的9%。2023年,此一稅項已貢獻該國政府15.7%的財政收入。若按香港私人消費開支計算,扣除現有重疊稅項,粗略估算每2%的GST可為特區政府帶來約270億元的增量收入,約佔2023年財政收入的5%。參考新加坡的經驗,零售業銷售在2007年及2023年調高GST稅率後有所下降,但在1994年、2003年及2004年調高GST稅率後沒有下降。近期RHB銀行的經濟學家在一項研究中指出,新加坡於2024年1月調高GST稅率後,對消費習慣並無明顯影響。從中可見,調高GST稅率後,零售業銷售並非必然變差,關鍵在於力度把控、預期管理和福利政策的相互配合,以確保市民保持消費意欲。

誠然,徵收GST在新加坡亦有引起爭議,例如有意見認為生活必需品應獲得豁免。新加坡政府不接納該意見的原因在於潛在增加的合規和審查成本,其選擇通過發放GST代金券、資助公共教育和醫療服務等方式來紓緩低收入家庭的生活壓力。無論如何,GST過低不足以減輕政府財困,過高則會引起商家、市民的不滿,以及可能造成過分的通脹壓力;如何在兩者之間取得平衡是政策制定的一大難點。此外,政府亦可考慮出售閒置資產,包括閒置物業和過剩股權,以紓緩財政壓力。

二、謀發展推公私營協作

特區政府可考慮通過加強公私營界別合作,推動基建發展,此舉既可減少政府前期投入和營運的成本,又能引進先進企業的技術和管理經驗。許多國際城市通過這種發展模式已取得了可觀成效。例如美國芝加哥的Skyway公路、加州長灘港的再發展項目、新加坡濱海灣金沙綜合度假村、國內北京地鐵4號線項目,以至本港的東區海底隧道等。公私營界別合作方式固然各式各樣,較常見的包括「建設-營運-移交」、「建設-擁有-營運」、「轉讓-營運-移交」等模式,香港可視乎實際需要斟酌選用。

三、藉獨特優勢融入大灣區

香港需要優化與大灣區其他城市之間的融合,充分揮區域經濟帶來的好處。香港與內地最近簽署《內地與香港關於建立更緊密經貿關係的安排》服務貿易協議第二份修訂協議,據此,當中內地對本港多個專業服務領域進一步開放。特區政府可在此基礎上,繼續與大灣區其他城市保持密切溝通和合作,以確保政策得到有效落實,例如幫助香港的產業測量企業進行備案,以便其通過聯合體模式競投大灣區的諮詢項目。

再者,香港的高等教育在大灣區內優勢明顯,政府可與各城市保持緊密合作,繼續支持香港高校於區內擴建分校,並在後續發展中取得成功。其中,尤其有必要打通「四流」,即人流、貨物流、資金流和資訊流,唯其如此,方能使大灣區分校同時獲得國內和國外的寶貴資源,並保持香港高校國際化的競爭優勢。

為最大程度上消除香港金融、法律和會計等各個專業領域服務大灣區市場的障礙,特區政府仍需要繼續推動打通大灣區內的制度壁壘。例如,香港律師會和中山大學在《香港法律執業者在粵港澳大灣區首階段發展現況調研報告》中指出,在目前的內地法規下,香港律師事務所與內地律師事務所聯營,不得採取合夥型聯營和法人型聯營。因此,實踐中香港律所和內地律所的合作主要是非合夥型聯營,其衍生出許多問題,例如律師利益衝突處理不同、業務受理範圍和處理標準不同、雙方法律責任規定不明確等。

四、積極搶人才兼吸引外資

在吸引內地人才和資金的同時,香港有必要重視吸引海外人才和外國資金,以維持自身作為國際大都市的相對優勢。當前地緣政治緊張,華裔頂尖科技人才在歐美等地發展事業遭遇障礙,特區政府不妨借機爭取他們來港發展。與此同時,特區政府亦可考慮為各大學設定具體的績效指標,例如規定外國學生須達到一定比例,以鞏固香港高校國際化的強項。

毋庸置疑,香港必須繼續利用「一國兩制」的獨特優勢,為內地招徠更多的外商直接投資。同時,引進重點企業辦公室除了繼續引進內資外,亦需要加強引進外國領先企業,以維持香港聯通世界的獨特優勢。人工智能、生命科技、金融科技、先進製造、新能源等新興產業的發展,關係到香港未來是否能夠創造更多優質工作,以壯大中產階層和促進經濟繁榮。

正如筆者於兩年前在本欄中提及,吸引人才的前提,是創造宜居宜業的環境。否則,即使人才來港,他們亦不會久留。一方面,人才需要在香港找到優質的工作、接觸到生氣勃勃的業界社群,以及享受舒適而多姿多采的生活環境;另一方面,人力資本是否優質亦是企業落戶香港的重要考慮因素。因此,招商引資、搶人才,甚至是文娛政策,應該相輔相成,而不是獨立運作。留住人才和企業是一個系統工程,香港需要全方位的政策配合,方能成功。


鄧希煒教授

港大經管學院副院長(對外事務)、馮國經馮國綸基金經濟學教授

張超藝
港大經管學院香港經濟及商業策略研究所高級研究助理

(本文同時於二零二四年十二月十八日載於《信報》「龍虎山下」專欄)