Creating a Good-jobs City

1. Introduction The Hong Kong economy faces three pressing problems: stagnant growth without new engines, rising living costs without increasing incomes, and widened inequality with a hollowed-out middle class. A remedy to these intertwined problems is the creation of good jobs, which are the pillar of a stable, affluent, and energetic city. The definition of…


1. Introduction

The Hong Kong economy faces three pressing problems: stagnant growth without new engines, rising living costs without increasing incomes, and widened inequality with a hollowed-out middle class. A remedy to these intertwined problems is the creation of good jobs, which are the pillar of a stable, affluent, and energetic city.

The definition of good jobs is inevitably slippery. Nevertheless, there is still consensus that a good job should generate an income that enables at least a middle-class lifestyle, and provide workers with employment security and clear career paths. In Hong Kong, people who have good jobs are managers, senior administrators, bankers, lawyers, doctors, designers, professional agents, and probably professors in addition to well-to-do business owners. These jobs emerged during the transition of Hong Kong into a modern metropolis and have been the backbone of the Hong Kong economy. However, with the recent technological revolution, changing flows of trade and capital, and transformation of geopolitics, more and more Hongkongers are drifting away from good jobs. In parallel, Hong Kong’s economy benefits less and less from these good-jobs sectors. To prevent the decline of economic competency and widening social inequalities, Hong Kong must rebuild a good-jobs city. Centering around two questions—where do good jobs come from? what policy design can help create good jobs?—this article outlines a strategic plan for rebuilding a good-jobs Hong Kong and proposes a number of feasible policies to achieve this goal.

2. Background: Five Myths About Job Creation in Hong Kong

In asking how to rebuild a good-job Hong Kong, the first natural question is: where do good jobs come from? This question was easy to answer decades ago, when ample opportunities presented themselves to Hong Kong as a bridge between the West and China. Good jobs came from where Hong Kong had a comparative advantage over mainland China, and where Hong Kong mediated the international flows of goods, services, and capital. However, answering this question is much more difficult today because Hong Kong’s role in the Asian-Pacific economy is no longer distinctively clear cut. Hong Kong’s advantages in the good old days may hinder the creation of new good jobs today. To better understand the potential decline of good jobs and answer the question of where good jobs come from in Hong Kong, we demystify five myths about job creation, and more generally, about the entire Hong Kong economy.       

Myth 1. Good jobs will recover and expand as long as the Hong Kong economy grows.

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated a substantial negative shock to the Hong Kong economy. Unemployment has intensified, and many good jobs cut. The Hong Kong government has used fiscal stimulus to avoid a demand crisis and resist a looming recession. An optimistic view is that after the economy recovers from the pandemic shock, good jobs will return and expand with economic growth. However, the main problem with job creation in Hong Kong is structural and distributional. Economic growth does not guarantee the abundance of good jobs. The last two decades have witnessed a trend of job polarization and the overall decline of good jobs in Hong Kong.

Figure 1 plots the dynamics of the Hong Kong job market by occupations. Most strikingly, the share of middle-income jobs—which include administrators, production workers, and even sales professionals—was disappearing, while the shares of both high- and low-income jobs increased. According to the latest micro data from Hong Kong’s Population Census, the growth of low-income jobs measured in changes in the share of total employment even surpassed the growth of high-income jobs over the past decade.

Figure 1: Changes in the Share of Employment by Occupations (%)

Source: Hong Kong’s Population Census

Note: The “high-income” group includes employment in the occupations of managers, administrators, professionals. The “mid-income” group includes employment in the occupations of associate professionals, clerks, and craft and related workers. The “low-income” group includes employment in elementary occupations, service and shop sales workers, and plant and machine operators and assemblers. Changes in share pf employment are calculated by the year’s employment share minus the previous year’s employment share.

The tendency of job polarization in Hong Kong bears some resemblance to the pattern in the US and other advanced economies (e.g., Autor 2019). It is deep rooted in the technological revolution, which favors top talent and replaces middle-ranged skills, as well as in regional specialization due to globalization. Therefore, Hong Kong faces a two-folded problem: (1) whether it can maintain a large share of high-income jobs; and (2) whether these jobs can generate sufficient spillovers to revive the return to mid-level skills and thus expand the middle-income jobs.     

Myth 2. A booming financial sector can create sufficient good jobs.

As in London and New York, the financial sector produces a cluster of high-pay jobs. Figure 2 shows the share of GDP, share of employment, and income increase of the financial sector in Hong Kong from 2000 to 2020. Since 2009, while the share of finance in GDP has increased from 15% to 20%, the financial sector has accounted for approximately 10% of the employment. This suggests that financial growth does not necessarily translate into employment expansion. Moreover, the slowdown of income increases after 2016 will constrain the flow of talent into finance. Another factor that may limit the employment expansion of the finance sector is the rapid adoption of AI technology in finance, which is likely to replace many finance-related jobs. Overall, without purposeful and directed development of the financial sector, its capacity for generating good jobs will have reached its limit.

Figure 2: Financial Sector in Hong Kong (2000 – 2020)

Source: Hong Kong’s Population Census

Unlike manufacturing, in which the expansion of an upstream firm directly generates demand and jobs for its downstream supplier, finance jobs do not have this multiplier effect. In other words, the supply chain in the finance sector is rather short. The employment spillover effect of a booming finance sector on other sectors is rather indirect, primarily through the demand for goods and services. In this aspect, the finance sector is unlikely to produce a large number of good jobs in the rest of the economy.          

Myth 3. It is important to bring manufacturing jobs back to Hong Kong.

Because of manufacturing firms’ ability to generate jobs, bringing manufacturing back has been a popular solution to aggregate employment problems in regions where manufacturing, after a glory period, moved to other regions. It is well known that Hong Kong was transformed into a manufacturing-led economy in the 1960s, and then gradually transferred to a service economy dominated by finance, logistics, and real estate after 1980s. The employment share of manufacturing declined continuously from slightly above 10% in 2000 to below 4% in 2020. Somewhat surprisingly, the return to manufacturing jobs—measured by the median monthly income in the sector—has gradually increased since 2010. Given this history, it is tempted to propose bringing manufacturing jobs back to Hong Kong for the sake of creating more good jobs and stabilizing the middle class. However, such a solution is neither necessary nor sufficient.

The decline of manufacturing and the rise of service industries is inevitable with economic advancements. Figure 3 demonstrates the time series of manufacturing share of employment from 1997 to 2021 in Hong Kong compared with four other Asian metropolitan cities: Singapore, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. With the exception of Guangzhou, the share of manufacturing jobs in these cities all exhibits a significant downward trend. Clearly, there is no correlation between the size of the manufacturing industry and the number of good jobs in an economy.

Figure 3: Shares of Employment in Manufacturing (%): Asian Metropolitan Cities

Source: Hong Kong’s Population Census, Singapore Department of Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China.

It is true that the other cities still maintain a sizeable manufacturing sector while manufacturing in Hong Kong is almost completely hollowed out. This distinct feature of Hong Kong, in contrast with the other Asian Tigers (Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea) and metropolises in mainland China (Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen), derives from its unique advantage not only as a hub of international trade and capital flow, but also as a gateway for Western firms to enter the Chinese market.    

Basic economics principles tell us that, given the high living and labor costs, to bring manufacturing jobs back to Hong Kong, two conditions have to be met. First, manufacturing firms in Hong Kong must be able to adopt advanced technology (and appropriate managerial practices) to boost their total factor productivity. Second, there must be sufficient supply of high-skilled labor to exploit the complementarity between human capital and physical capital. Without these conditions, products made in Hong Kong will not survive fierce market competition, and good manufacturing jobs, even if created, will not be sustainable. Unfortunately, these two conditions are unlikely to appear in the near future. In the short- to medium-run, it is unrealistic to rely on the manufacturing sector to produce streams of good jobs in Hong Kong.

Myth 4. Good jobs in Hong Kong are stolen by mainland cities.

It is true that a large number of good jobs are created on the mainland because businesses operated by Hong Kong entrepreneurs or originated from Hong Kong move to mainland cities, especially those in the Greater Bay Area (GBA). However, there is neither solid evidence nor sound logic to support the substitution between good jobs in Hong Kong and those in mainland cities.

In the 1980s, when manufacturing jobs moved to the mainland en masse, Hong Kong did not lose good jobs. Instead, service jobs with higher pay and greater mobility proliferated. This is the power of specialization on the basis of comparative advantage. Nowadays, Hong Kong’s advantages over mainland cities are less clear cut, and the regional specialization within mainland China tends to create competitive pressure on Hong Kong. The oft-cited case is the rise of Shanghai as a competing finance center in Asia. If within the same industry and facing the same market, Hong Kong loses its edge to mainland cities, lucrative business opportunities and associated good jobs will likely drain out from Hong Kong. However, this is not happening; the structure of the Hong Kong economy is so distinctive that no mainland cities can replicate and replace it. To the extent that firms in Hong Kong cooperate with their mainland business partners, the integration of the Hong Kong economy into the GBA will facilitate the creation of new good jobs in Hong Kong.

Myth 5. Investment in higher education does not pay off in Hong Kong.

It has been puzzling to outsiders that despite the relatively low cost of receiving higher education, the number of young Hongkongers with a bachelor’s degree is disproportionately low compared to the abundance of positions offered by numerous universities in Hong Kong. In most PhD and master programs, rarely can we see the presence of local students. One popular answer to this puzzle is that education is not important to make money in Hong Kong, and investment in higher education does not pay off. This answer would have made sense twenty years ago when business opportunities abounded and the skills for being good merchants and businessmen were more valuable than formal education.

The problem with the relatively lower return to higher education in Hong Kong is structural. The Hong Kong economy is dominated by services, and only a small fraction of service jobs, for instance, in the finance sector, require substantial investment in formal education. Moreover, the Hong Kong labor market is highly localized and rigid. Therefore, the market does not provide sufficient opportunities for science and engineering graduates to apply their knowledge. However, with Hong Kong being transformed into a more-advanced economy and becoming more connected to high-skilled sectors, more and more good jobs require a higher level of general and specific education.

3. Strategic Plan: Three Pillars to Sustain and Expand Good Jobs

In clarifying the above five myths, it may seem that we hold a pessimistic view towards Hong Kong. To the contrary, our intention is to paint a realistic picture to help make a forward-looking and strategic plan for the Hong Kong economy. As we have stressed, Hong Kong is a unique economy with numerous non-imitable strengths. The key for a feasible strategic plan is to leverage these strengths and discover a path towards the goal with minimal disruptions and resistance.

In Hong Kong, the pillars of GDP and employment have been four traditional industries, namely, financial services, tourism, trading and logistics, and professional services. As seen in Figure 4, the employment share of these four pillar industries has been declining since 2011, largely driven by the rapid decline in employment in the “trading and logistics” and “tourism and related services” sectors. Aiming to expand good jobs and boost economic growth, the core of our proposed strategic plan is to upgrade two pillars (finance and professional services) and replace the two deteriorated pillars with a new one (high-tech).

Figure 4: Employment shares of Hong Kong’s 4-Pillar Industries (%)

Source: Hong Kong’s Population Census

A. Enhanced Financial Sector

The finance sector remains a strong pillar that provides a large quantity of good jobs in Hong Kong. With heightened China-US tensions, many Chinese firms listed in the US stock market have moved back to Hong Kong. This explains the expansion of the financial sector in Hong Kong despite the overall economic contraction. This trend will continue at least in the short run, and it is foreseeable that the finance sector will keep generating good jobs.

To enhance the finance pillar, the Hong Kong finance market should adapt its existing regulatory framework to increase its flexibility and provide higher quality services to attract more firms from mainland China, India, and East Asia. Another booster of the finance sector is fintech, which requires a broader skillset than traditional financial jobs and will generate streams of good jobs. Moreover, fintech is a natural stepping stone for Hong Kong to move onto its high-tech path, and will promote the employment of high-skilled workers in the science and technology sector.

An active venture capital industry significantly enlarges the finance sector. However, while Hong Kong is abundant in hot money and entrepreneurship, it lacks venture capital. This is perhaps caused by the lack of commercialization opportunities in Hong Kong. Thus, the cultivation of venture capital should go hand-in-hand with the development of high-tech industries in Hong Kong.

B. Upgraded Service Sector

The services sector accounts for the lion’s share of employment in Hong Kong. However, a large portion of service work is oriented to local consumers and does not benefit much from either technological progress or globalization. The shrinking middle class will hurt providers of local services even further. Service jobs oriented to outsiders, particularly tourists, are sensitive to external factors and unstable in a changing environment. Therefore, Hong Kong faces the urgent need of upgrading its services sector as an engine of generating good jobs.

Among traditional service jobs, those providing professional services (e.g., legal, accounting, and consultancy) for local business activities belong to the good-job category. The economic integration of Hong Kong into the GBA provides ample opportunities for Hong Kong professionals to expand the scope of their services. Two particularly attractive areas of services are healthcare and higher education. These are two pivotal sectors that will have a long-term impact on the creation of good jobs for Hongkongers.

C. Emerging High-tech Sector

In the last decade, the contribution of the information technology sector to employment has increased. Although the share is still small (around 4% in 2021), it shows some sign that Hong Kong is moving towards the high-tech trajectory. The emergence of a sizeable high-tech sector is crucial to the future of Hong Kong, in terms of both economic growth and job creation.

Globally, high-tech jobs pay well. This is the undeniable triumph of science and technology. Moreover, economic research has shown that creating high-tech jobs has a strong multiplying effect on other job markets, including those in non-tech industries. Specifically, Moretti (2012) finds that in the US, a high-tech job created can lead to five other positions added in the economy, including those in high- and low-skilled service sectors. In this regard, creating high-tech jobs can expand the diversity of jobs and foster inclusive economic growth.

One may wonder what comparative advantages Hong Kong has in high-tech industries. Hong Kong’s comparative advantage outside high-skilled services are probably in finance- and medical-related fields. The city has the potential to be a manufacturing and design hub for high-tech products in medical, biotech, pharmaceutical, and financial sectors. So far, the government, the Monetary Authority, and industry have pledged to develop fintech, which uses artificial intelligence and big data. In the healthcare and biotech sectors, digitalization and the adoption of artificial intelligence will also be key trends. There should be constructive cross-overs between the healthcare and IT sectors.

4. Government’s Helping Hand: Four Policy Proposals

In the strategic plan described above, the essential idea concerns the redistribution of jobs across sectors. Such redistribution will not happen automatically. In a free market economy, it will be guided by the returns to human capital and talent across occupations and industries, which in turn depend on existing comparative advantages and the pace of technological adoption. Moreover, all sorts of market frictions will hinder the redistribution of jobs. Therefore, to facilitate the process of creating good jobs, government intervention is called for.

There are two traditional ways of government intervention. One is the Keynesian way of demand management, through which the government stimulates demand for certain goods and services and thus creates jobs in the target sector. The other way involves the design of industrial policies that directly reallocate resources towards the target industries. Both methods of government intervention raise concerns of inefficient use of public money and the distortion of resource allocation, and as such will likely face substantial resistance in Hong Kong. We propose a third way of government intervention: the government offers a helping hand to facilitate the accumulation of critical resources and relaxation of constraints in target sectors.

The intellectual origin of our proposed government intervention comes from Albert Hirschman’s idea of deliberate unbalanced growth (Hirschman, 1958) and, more recently, Dani Rodrik’s advocacy of inclusive growth (Rodrik and Sabel, 2019). They view the problem of stagnant growth and rising inequalities as a problem of gross economic inefficiency and mismatch between private pursuits and social consideration. Thus, the government should intervene to internalize the positive externalities of desirable economic activities (good jobs) and limit the negative externalities of undesirable economic activities (bad jobs). Based on this basic idea, we propose the following four policy suggestions. 

Proposal 1. Talent trategy. The Hong Kong government should adopt a grand talent strategy to attract and retain top talents, enlarge the talent pool, and improve labor mobility.

In today’s world, top talents are critical resources for many advanced economies and have become a highly mobile class. Any unfavorable factor could trigger a massive outflow of talents. For instance, given the rising tension between China and the West (the U.S. in particular), some leading science and technology experts in the West may be encouraged by certain push factors to consider opportunities in Asia. This provides good chances for Hong Kong and other Asian metropolises. Besides financial incentives and living conditions, top talents pay particular attention to whether there is a competent peer group to co-create ideas and products and whether there are complementary human resources to boost their productivity. Without a sufficiently large talent pool, Hong Kong will encounter significant difficulties of keeping top talents. Therefore, attracting top talents and building a talent pool are two sides of the same coin. The problem is that Hong Kong does not have a sufficiently large talent reservoir. 

To solve the talent shortage problem, the Hong Kong government should take measures to attract more foreign talents as well as to extend the talent market to mainland China. Regarding policies to attract foreign talents, the Hong Kong government should consider fine-tuning and expanding the scale of existing plans. For instance, only 321 skilled workers have come to Hong Kong since 2018 through the Technology Talent Admission Scheme (TechTAS), far below the expected 1,000-person target. While it is likely related to Hong Kong’s economic instability in recent years, certain inflexible aspects of the plan may be partly to blame. For example, the two-year fixed term employment contract for foreign skilled workers and the bundled arrangement to employ at least one local staff per foreign worker hired at a related position are some of the reasons that have discouraged companies to use the plan.

Extending Hong Kong’s talent market to mainland China should focus on enhancing labor mobility across borders rather than arranged talent flows. On the Hong Kong side, the Hong Kong government should substantially reduce barriers to the inflow of talents from mainland China. On the mainland side, the Hong Kong government should collaborate with local governments and firms to enhance the two-way flows of talents.

Proposal 2. Public-private R&D partnership. The Hong Kong government should develop a new model of public-private collaboration to increase R&D expenditure in critical sectors.

In 2020, R&D expenditure accounts for approximately 1% of the GDP for Hong Kong. Although this is a notable improvement from 0.5% in 2001, it remains significantly lower than most developed economies’ counterparts (e.g., 1.94% for Singapore, 4.55% for South Korea, 3.26% for Japan, 2.82% for the U.S.) and many mainland cities (e.g., 6.3% for Beijing, 4.1% for Shanghai, 4.2% for Shenzhen, and 3.2% for Guangzhou).

One barrier limiting the expansion of R&D investment in Hong Kong is the government’s lack of determination and policy tools to effectively distribute the R&D expenditure. In the government’s 2017 policy address, then-chief executive Carrie Lam proposed to increase the share of R&D in the city’s GDP to 1.5% (approximately HKD 45 billion or USD 5.8 billion per year) by 2022. Compared with the government’s multiple epidemic relief measures totaling HKD 300 billion, the HKD 45 billion pledge as a long-term annual investment target is not ambitious. But the government still fell short of the scheduled target.

Other than making binding commitments to public R&D expenditure, the Hong Kong government should actively collaborate with the private sector to increase overall R&D investment and the efficient use of R&D resources. To this end, the government may consider using part of the substantially increased R&D expenditure to form partnerships with private firms to establish scientific research institutions for technological innovation and product design. Pilot areas include biotechnology, medical science, and financial technology, which are some of Hong Kong’s existing comparative advantages. The government can also contract with local firms in its procurement of high-tech products and services. In addition to these quantity-based tools, the Hong Kong government should also flexibly use price-based tools, such as credit and tax incentives, to increase private firms’ propensity for R&D investment, and importantly, improve specific innovators’ initiative. 

Proposal 3. Strategic cooperation with mainland cities. The Hong Kong government should cooperate with governments in major mainland cities to co-expand business opportunities and co-create good jobs.

As discussed before, because of its distinct economic structure and unique advantages, Hong Kong does not directly compete with mainland cities. Rather, Hong Kong will benefit tremendously from its booming neighbors. Integration into the GBA provides a promising path for Hong Kong to relax its resource constraints and upgrade its economy. The Hong Kong government should provide economic incentives to attract overseas and mainland Chinese new-economy companies to set up affiliates in Hong Kong. The goal is to transfer technology and knowhow, and to ultimately create high-tech jobs in Hong Kong. Policies such as subsidizing the labor costs of firms that can create good jobs will not only solve the shortage of talent supply but also help increase local demand for technology workers.

Cooperation with mainland cities requires the Hong Kong government to coordinate with and learn from the policymaking of its counterparts, which have developed an inventory of good practices and pilot programs. For instance, Shanghai government’s adoption of a comprehensive talent strategy and Shenzhen government’s leveraging of the private sector for R&D investment are well-acclaimed. Learning these practices will not only smooth Hong Kong’s collaboration with mainland cities but will help Hong Kong’s policy design and implementation.

Proposal 4. Leveraging higher-education. The Hong Kong government should leverage and enhance the ample resources in the higher-education sector to facilitate Hong Kong’s economic upgrading and the creation of good jobs.

Universities play an important role in all the above three proposed policies. Research universities serve as a reservoir of top talents, a platform of materializing public R&D investment, a channel to link the public and private sectors in knowledge-intensive production, and a factory to assemble and create knowledge distributed across various parts of a society. Proximity to top universities gives firms substantial advantages in technology transfer and innovation. Therefore, besides increasing the supply of mid-level talents, the Hong Kong government should simultaneously increase the quantity and quality of scientists and researchers from local universities.

The combined research and educational resources of all Hong Kong universities are incredibly rich. To better utilize these resources, the Hong Kong government should grant universities more autonomy. For example, the University Grants Committee currently has fixed quotas on the number of postgraduate student intakes in each department of a university. At the University of Hong Kong, this means that the Department of Economics at has about 30 full-time research faculty members, but can only accept a maximum of 8-10 doctoral students each year. From the perspective of training and research, the ratio is far from ideal.

It should be noted that most of the doctoral students trained in Hong Kong are from mainland China. Even if the increased supply of doctoral students cannot be absorbed in the local labor market in the short run, many of the doctoral graduates can still choose to work in research institutions, companies, and universities in China. These students will be critical resources for talent mobility between Hong Kong and mainland China.

Similarly, the Hong Kong government should relax the quota of enrollment of non-local undergraduate students, at least in areas where local students are short of supply, for instance, STEM students. More and more mainland students will return to the mainland after receiving their education in Hong Kong. The massive flows of these students will help facilitate the integration of Hong Kong’s labor market into the mainland’s labor market, which is highly valuable for Hong Kong’s economic transition. Moreover, given that the education and training provided by universities in Hong Kong are globally recognized, increasing the supply of “made-in-Hong Kong” students can help raise Hong Kong’s soft power and its status as a global knowledge hub.

5. Conclusion

After a long period of “easy” growth, the Hong Kong economy now lags behind the technological revolution led by the rapid adoption of IT and AI, and has lost some of its unique strengths in the global division of economic activities. Hong Kong faces a trio of aggregate, structural, and distributional problems. As economic growth slows down, business activities delivering mid-level incomes hollow out, and social inequalities widen. We propose the creation of a good-jobs city to simultaneously solve these problems.

The importance of creating more good jobs for Hong Kong is not yet well recognized. We clarify five myths with regard to job creation in Hong Kong. Overall, Hong Kong needs to increase industrial diversity, enlarge market size, and improve labor mobility. Instead of advocating drastic changes, we recommend gradual adjustments to enhance the financial sector, upgrade the service sector, and cultivate an emerging high-tech sector. These three sectors will be the basis of producing a large quantity of good jobs in Hong Kong.

We see the creation of good jobs as a result of relaxing resource constraints, improving gross economic inefficiency, and solving economic externalities. The Hong Kong government should not shy away from its role in leading the economic transition and facilitating the redistribution of jobs towards good industries. To help the government carry out this role, we make four concrete policy proposals involving talent strategy, public-private partnership in R&D investment, strategic cooperation with mainland cities, and leveraging the higher-education sector.

References

Autor, David (2019) “Work of the Past, Work of the Future.” AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 109, pp. 1-32.

Hirschman, Albert (1958). The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Moretti, Enrico (2012). The New Geography of Jobs. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Rodrik, Dani, and Charles Sabel (2019) “Building a good jobs economy.” NBER Working Paper.

Translation

創建優質工作之城


鄧希煒、吳延暉


1. 引言


香港經濟正面臨三大當務之急:增長停滯而欠缺新發動機;生活成本上漲而收入未見增長;不均加劇而中產階級空心化。問題盤根錯節,一個有效的解決方法便是創造優質工作,讓優質工作成為一個穩定、富裕、活力充沛城市的支柱。

何謂優質工作固然難以界定,但一般人對此仍有共識,就是應能提供就業保障,至少能有足以維繫中產階級生活方式的收入,並且有升職和事業發展的機會。在香港,所謂優質工作,離不開管理人員、高級行政人員、銀行家、律師、醫生、設計師、專業代理人,以至教授及成功商家。此等工作莫不衍生於香港蛻化成現代大都會的過程,構成經濟的骨幹。然而,隨着近年的科技革命、貿易和資金流的變化,以及地緣政治的演變,香港人離優質工作愈來愈遠,而整體經濟受惠於優質工作行業也愈來愈少。為免經濟能力下滑和社會不均加劇,香港必須著手重建優質工作城市,聚焦以下兩大問題──優質工作從何而來?怎樣的政策設計才有助於創造此等工作?本文就如何重建一個優質工作比比皆然的香港,勾勒出一套策略性計劃,並且臚列可達成目標的多項可行政策。

2. 背景:關於在香港創造職位的五大認識誤區


探究如何重建充滿優質工作的香港,必先要問:優質工作從何而來?數十年前,此地作為溝通中西的橋樑,機遇處處,答案自然十分簡單。優質工作既來自香港優於內地之處,也有賴香港在國際貨物、服務、資金進出所發揮的中介作用。時移勢易,問題已不再那麼直截了當,因為香港在亞太區經濟中擔當的角色已不如以往清晰可見。昔日黃金歲月中的優勢,或有礙於今天創造優質職位。要進一步了解此等工作漸失的底蘊,並解答優質工作從何而來的問題,下文將列舉對創造職位以至香港整體經濟的五大認識誤區。

誤區1:隨着香港經濟重回正軌,優質工作自會恢復舊觀,並有所增加

近幾年來,新冠肺炎疫災對本港經濟產生系統性衝擊。失業壓力應聲加劇,不少優質工作遭削減。特區政府一直以財政手段刺激經濟,以免出現需求危機,同時頂住衰退來勢。樂觀的看法是,只要經濟從疫症大流行打擊中復甦,優質工作自然重來,並會隨經濟增長而增多。可惜創造職位的主要問題既屬結構性,也具分佈性。經濟增長不一定保證就會有充足的優質工作;工作職位兩極化和優質工作整體減少的現象,已在近20年來出現。

【圖1】顯示按職業分類的香港就業市場變化。最令人矚目之處,在於行政人員、生產人員,甚至營銷專業人員等中產職業均正逐漸消失,反而高收入和低收入職位的比重同告增加。 根據最新香港人口普查微數據,近10年來,在整體就業人數比重變化中,低收入職位的增幅甚至已超越高收入工作。



資料來源:香港人口普查

註:「高收入」組別包括管理人員、行政人員、專業人員;「中等收入」組別包括輔助專業人員、文員、工藝匠及有關人員;「低收入」組別包括非技術工人、服務及商店銷售人員、機台及機器操作員及裝配員。就業人數比重變化的計算方法,就是將某年就業比率減去前一年就業比率所得。

香港的工作職位兩極化現象與美國及其他先進經濟體(例如Autor, 2019)頗相類似,植根於講求頂尖人才而取代中層技能的科技革命,以及全球化所致的區域專業化。因此,香港面臨雙重難關:一、能否保持高收入職位的高比重;二、能否令這些工作產生足夠溢出效應,促使中層技能重受重視,從而增加中等收入工作。

誤區2:發展蓬勃的金融業能創造足夠的優質工作

一如倫敦和紐約 , 金融業足以聚集高收入工作。【圖2】顯示2000至2020年金融業在香港GDP、就業、收入增長中的比重變化 。 自2009年以來 , 金融業在GDP的比率從15% 漸升至20%,金融業在香港整體就業約佔10%。可見金融業的增長未必能擴充就業 。 再者, 收入增長在2016年之後放緩, 將窒礙人才流入金融業 。 有礙於該行業就業增長的另一因素, 在於人工智能迅即獲業界採納,以致不少金融相關工作或將被取代。 總而言之,除非金融業銳意發展,目標明確,否則其創造優質職位的能力相信已達上限。



資源來源:香港人口普查

上游企業擴充業務,就可直接為下游供應商創造需求和職位,這種情況多見於製造業,而金融業職位卻無法產生類似乘數效應。簡而言之,金融業屬於供應鏈甚短的產業,即使發展蓬勃,對其他經濟部門的就業溢出效應主要以商品和服務需求為途徑,效果間接,作用有限。從這方面而言,金融業很難為其他經濟領域創造大量優質工作。

誤區3:有必要把製造業工作帶回香港

對製造業由盛轉衰、隨之外移的地區,其解決積重就業難題的慣用方案,往往是把製造業帶回原地,皆因此行業創造職位的威力。眾所周知,香港在1960年代轉型以製造業為主導;1980年代以後逐步發展為以金融、物流、地產牽頭的服務型經濟。2000年,製造業在整體就業中的比重略高於10%,到了2020年則跌至低於4%。令人頗感意外的是,自2010年以來,按製造業每月收入中位數計算,業內職位又漸見增長。觀乎這段歷史,雖然建議將製造業職位帶回香港以創造優質工作和穩住中產階級,可說不無誘因,但這一方案既沒必要,也難以奏效。

製造業式微而服務業興起,是經濟進程必然的趨勢。【圖3】是1997至2021年香港製造業的就業比重與新加坡、上海、廣州、深圳四大亞洲大都會的對照。除卻廣州,其餘城市的製造業一律明顯走下坡;可見製造業規模與經濟體內優質工作的多寡並無關連。



資料來源:香港人口普查、新加坡統計局、中國國家統計局

事實上,其他城市仍有頗具規模的製造業,而香港製造業則已近乎徹底空洞化。這一特點有別於亞洲其他小龍(新加坡、台灣、南韓)以及內地大都會(上海、廣州、深圳),實源於香港作為國際貿易及資金流樞紐兼西方企業通往內地市場門戶的獨特優勢。

從經濟學基本原理可知,鑑於香港生活和勞工成本高昂,要重新引入製造業職位,必須具備兩個條件。第一,製造企業必須能夠採納先進科技(以及適當管理實務),以增強其全要素生產力。第二,高技術勞動力供應充足,以利用人力資本與物質資本之間的互補性。否則,產品將難以在激烈的市場競爭中生存,而優質製造業工作即使能夠創造,也將無以為繼。可是這兩個條件一時難以幻化成形;短期以至中期之內,要靠製造業在香港創造大量優質工作,無異緣木求魚。

誤區4:香港的優質工作已被內地城市偷去

與上述誤區3相關,另一個認識誤區是內地城市偷去了香港不少優質工作。無庸置疑,大批由香港企業家創造,或源自香港的優質工作已經北移,特別是粵港澳大灣區內的城市。然而,並無充分證據或理性邏輯足以印證香港和內地城市的優質工作之間有明顯替代關係。

1980年代,正當大批製造企業遷往內地,香港並未有失去優質工作,反而待遇較高、流動性較大的服務業職位大增。這正是基於對比優勢的專業化威力。今時今日,香港相對於內地城市的優勢已不如昔日明顯,而內地的區域專業化則往往對香港構成競爭壓力。最常引用的例子,就是上海冒起成為可與香港在亞洲分庭抗禮的金融中心。假使在同一產業又面對同一市場,香港相對內地城市並無優勢,按說盈利可觀的商業良機及相關優質工作難免會離港而去。但實情卻並非如此——香港經濟結構如斯獨特,以致任何內地城市都無法複製或取代。反而在香港企業與內地商業夥伴合作的大前提下,香港經濟由此融入大灣區,將有助本港創造優質工作。

誤區5:在香港投資高等教育難望有可觀回報

一直令外人大惑不解的是,即使在香港高等教育學費相對偏低,為何相對於本地各大學提供的學額,持有學士學位的香港青年仍少得不成比例。博士及碩士課程班上,亦少見本地學生蹤影。一種慣常的解釋是,教育無助於在香港賺錢,投資高等教育回報並不可觀。回到20年前,如此解釋倒能自圓其說,因為當時商機處處,營商技能較正規教育更有價值。

高等教育的回報在香港偏低是結構性問題。香港經濟以服務業為主,其中只有小部分職位(例如金融業)要求具備重金投資的正規學歷。此外,整體勞動市場因高度本地化和僵化,未能為理學和工程學畢業生提供足夠學以致用的機會。然而,隨着香港逐步轉型為更先進經濟體,而與高技術行業聯繫日趨緊密,講求普通科和專科學歷較高的優質工作正日益增加。

3. 策略性計劃:保持並增加優質工作的三大支柱


列舉五大認識誤區,似有筆者對香港前途感到悲觀的意味。相反,筆者用意在描畫實況,以便為香港經濟制定前瞻性和策略性兼備的計劃。正如上文強調,香港是個獨一無二的經濟體,獨特優勢不一而足,也效法不來。制定可行策略性計劃的關鍵在於發揮這些優勢,並發掘達標途徑,而不致造成對現有經濟的嚴重干擾,引發各界群起反對。

香港的GDP和就業支柱一直是四大傳統產業,即金融、旅遊、貿易及物流、專業及工商業支援服務。【圖4】顯示四大支柱產業的就業比重自2011年以來持續下降,背後主因在於貿易及物流和旅遊及相關服務行業的就業急跌。為增加優質工作和促進經濟增長,筆者提出的策略性計劃重點在升級兩大支柱(金融和專業服務),並以新支柱產業(高科技)取代其餘兩個夕陽支柱產業。



資料來源:香港人口普查

 

A. 強化金融業

金融業在香港仍是強大支柱,吸納大量優質工作。隨着中美兩國矛盾加劇,不少在美國股市掛牌的中國企業已轉到香港上市。由此可見,香港經濟雖然緊縮,但金融業仍有所發展,此趨勢至少將在短期內持續,在可見未來,金融業可望繼續創造優質工作。

為強化金融支柱,金融市場應改造其現有規管架構,增強靈活性之餘,並提升服務素質,以招徠更多中國內地、印度,以及東亞的企業。金融科技尤其倚重技能,將可創造多系列優質工作,亦可順理成章作為香港邁向高科技的踏腳石,有助促進高技術人員在科技界就業。

創業投資行業朝氣勃勃,無疑對金融業擴充規模大有裨益。令人頗感意外的是,香港不愁熱錢,也充滿創業精神,唯獨創業資金不足。原因也許在於缺乏創新產品。因此,積聚創業資金應與發展高科技產業齊頭並進。

 

B. 升級服務業

服務業雖在香港整體就業中佔最大比重,但其中大部分工作主要以本地顧客為對象,並未顯著受惠於科技進展和全球化。中產階級萎縮更將進一步打擊本地服務業供應商。以外人(特別是遊客)為對象的服務工作,則極易受外圍因素影響,而難以在瞬息萬變的環境中保持穩定。因此,香港當務之急,是升級服務業作為創造優質工作的發動機。

傳統服務工作之中,為本地商業活動提供的專業服務(例如法律、會計、顧問服務)均屬優質工作範疇。香港經濟融入大灣區,可讓本地專業人員大展拳腳,擴充服務範圍,其中以保健醫療和高等教育尤具吸引力。這兩類中堅行業將可為香港人在創造優質工作方面發揮長遠作用。

 

C.振興高科技

近10年來,資訊科技與資訊業對就業人口的貢獻續有增加。雖然比重仍小(2021年僅約4%),亦可見香港正朝高科技發展軌道邁進。具規模的高科技業得以形成,在經濟增長和創造職位方面,對香港前途至關重要。

高科技工作待遇優厚,全球皆然,可謂科技成就的明證。經濟研究亦顯示,創造高科技工作,足以對其他工作市場,包括非科技產業職位產生乘數效應。以美國為例,Moretti (2012) 發現,每創造1個高科技職位,就會在整體經濟中新增5個職位,範圍包括高技術及低技術服務業。在這方面而言,創造高科技職位足以促進職位多樣化,並帶動包容性經濟增長。

不少人心中都有此一問:到底香港在高科技方面有何比較優勢?在高技術服務業以外,其比較優勢大概在金融和醫療相關範疇。本港具備足夠潛力發展成製造及設計樞紐,出產醫療、生物科技、製藥、金融業的高科技產品。政府、金融管理局,以及業界對開發大量運用人工智能和大數據的金融科技已有共識。至於醫療和生物科技業,數碼化和採用人工智能亦將成為趨勢。至於保健醫療業與資訊科技業,兩者應有良性跨界合作。

 

4. 政府扶助:四項政策建議


在上述策略性計劃中,要點繫於不同業界之間重新分配職位。此舉當然不會自然發生。在自由市場經濟,帶動重新分配的是人力資本回報和各行各業的人才,而背後所倚杖的,則為現有比較優勢和科技採納進度。此外,種種市場摩擦將有礙於職位重新分配。因此,要促進創造優質工作的過程,政府介入在所難免。

政府介入的傳統方式有兩種。一是凱恩斯式需求管理,以便政府刺激特定類別商品和服務的需求,達致在目標行業創造職位。另一方式涉及設計產業政策,從而直接將資源重新分配至目標行業。兩種方式都有無法善用公帑和扭曲資源分配之虞。不難想像,由此衍生的政策建議在香港必會遭遇強烈反對。筆者則建議另一種政府介入方式:由政府助一臂之力,以便累積關鍵資源,並為目標行業拆牆鬆綁,放寬限制。

筆者此一建議,學術上本於希曼(Albert Hirschman)的「束意不均衡發展」觀(Hirschman, 1958)以及羅德里克(Dani Rodrik)的「包容性增長」主張(Rodrik and Sabel, 2019)。兩位經濟學家認為,增長停滯和不均加劇問題源於經濟嚴重失效和個人事業與社會所需之間嚴重錯配。因此,政府應該介入,以將理想經濟活動(優質工作)的正面界外效應加以內化,並將有欠理想的經濟活動(劣質工作)的負面界外效應加以抑制。基於此一基本觀念,筆者提出下列4項政策建議。

建議1:人才策略。香港特區政府應採取遠大人才策略,以吸引並挽留頂尖人才,擴充人才庫,改善勞工流動情況。

當今之世,頂尖人才既是很多先進經濟體的關鍵資源,也成為流動性甚高的階層。任何不利因素,都足以觸發人才大舉外流。舉例來說,鑑於中國與西方(尤其是美國)的緊張局勢不斷升溫,西方部分頂尖科技專家,或有動機考慮前赴亞洲發展,因而可為香港及區內其他大都會帶來良機。除了財政誘因及生活條件之外,頂尖人才尤其關心是否有一群能幹的同儕共創新觀念和新產品,又是否有配套人力資源可提升其生產力。若人才庫不夠大,香港就難以挽留頂尖人才。因此,吸引頂尖人才與構建人才庫實為一體兩面;問題是香港人才庫規模仍未夠大。

要解決人才短缺問題,特區政府應採取措施吸引更多外國人才,並將人才市場擴展至中國內地。吸引外國人才的政策方面,政府應考慮微調並擴充現有計劃。例如自2018年以來,經科技人才入境計劃來港的技術人員僅得321名,遠低於1,000人的目標名額。雖然這或與香港近年來經濟不穩不無關係,但某程度上或可歸咎於計劃中部分規定缺乏彈性。例如要求外國技術人員簽署兩年固定期限僱傭合約,以及每輸入1名外國人員須另聘至少1名本地員工擔任相關職位的綑綁式安排,都是企業對此計劃望而卻步的部分原因。

至於將香港人才市場擴展至內地,重點應在促進跨境勞工流動方面,而非特約人才流。香港方面,政府應減少對引入內地人才的關卡。內地方面,香港政府應與內地地方政府及企業合作,以促進雙向人才流。

建議2:公私營研發合作。特區政府應建立嶄新公私營合作模式,以增加關鍵行業的研究發展開支。

2020年,研發開支約佔香港GDP 的1%。雖然相對於2001年僅得0.5% 的比重已有顯著改善,但仍遠低於大部分發達經濟體(例如新加坡1.94%、南韓4.55%、日本3.26%、美國2.82%)以及不少內地城市(例如北京6.3%、上海4.1%、深圳4.2%、廣州3.2%)。

香港研發投資的障礙之一,是政府缺乏決心及政策工具,未能有效分配研發開支。在2017年《施政報告》中,時任特首林鄭月娥建議最遲在2022年將研發開支相對GDP的比率提高至1.5%(每年約450億港元,相當於58億美元)。相較於政府在多輪抗疫紓困措施方面達3,000億港元的支出,450億港元作為長期按年投資目標的承諾,實在不算過分。但政府最終亦未能實現此一原定目標。

除了就公共研發開支作出具約束力的承諾以外,政府同時應積極與私營界別合作,以提高總研發投資及運用研發資源的效率。為此,政府不妨可考慮將部分大幅增加的研發開支,撥作夥拍私人企業之用,以設立從事技術創新及產品設計的科研機構。先導領域包括生物科技、醫學和金融科技,這幾方面均在香港現有比較優勢之列。當局還可通過本地企業,採購高科技產品及服務。除了這些基於數量的工具之外,亦應靈活運用信貸及稅務寬減等基於價值的工具,以推動私人企業的研發投資,更重要的是改進特定創新者的主動性。

建議3:與內地城市的策略性合作。香港特區政府應與內地各大城市的政府合作,共增商機並同創優質工作。

正如上述分析,由於具備獨特經濟結構和優勢,香港與內地城市並無直接競爭,反而將憑藉鄰近城市發展興旺而大受其惠。融入大灣區為香港提供大有可為的路徑,從而紓緩短絀資源,升級整體經濟。特區政府應提供經濟誘因,以吸引海外及內地的中國新經濟企業來港設立附屬公司;目標在轉移技術和專門知識,最終得以在港創造高科技職位。向足以創造優質工作的企業提供勞工成本資助等政策,既可解決人才供應瓶頸,亦可提高本地對技術人員的需求。

要與內地城市合作,特區政府務須從中協調,並在決策方面向已建立起一套範例和試驗計劃的對口地方政府取經。例如上海市政府推出的周全人才策略,以及深圳市政府借助私營界別所作研發投資的做法,都廣受讚揚。若能加以學習,不但可便於香港與內地城市合作,也有助於本港的政策設計和執行。

建議4:借力高等教育。政府應發揮並提升高等教育界的充裕資源,從而促進香港經濟升級,並創造優質工作。

大學在以上3項建議政策中,擔當舉足輕重的角色。研究型大學可充當頂尖人才庫;落實公共研發投資的平台;在知識密集生產方面,作為聯繫公私營界別的途徑;以及聚集和創造知識,作為分配給社會各界的工廠。鄰近優秀大學的企業,更在技術轉移和創新過程方面大有優勢。因此,除了增加中層人才的供應以外,特區政府還應同時致力於提高本地大學科研人員的量和質。

本地各所大學的整體研究與教育資源無比豐厚充裕,若要善加利用,政府應予以更大自主權。例如大學教育資助委員會現時對各大學各學系取錄研究生名額都有限定;香港大學經管學院約有30名全職研究型教員,但每年錄取的博士生名額最高僅為8至10個。從培訓及研究方面來看,比例都遠遠未符理想。

須知香港大部分博士生來自內地。即使其數量增加後短期內未能獲本港勞動市場吸納,不少博士生仍能選擇在內地的研究機構、企業、大學工作。這批學生也將是香港與內地之間人才流動的關鍵資源。

同一道理,特區政府亦應放寬非本地本科生的錄取名額,至少在本地生短缺的範疇,例如科學、科技、工程和數學(STEM)相關學科。在香港接受教育之後,愈來愈多內地生將返回內地。這些學生大量回流,促成本港勞動市場融入內地勞動市場,對香港經濟轉型將十分有利。再者,鑑於香港各大學教育和培訓獲全球認可,增加「香港製造」學生,能更進一步鞏固特區的軟實力及其作為全球知識樞紐的地位。

5. 結語


經過長期「得來容易」的增長之後,香港經濟落後於由資訊科技和人工智能迅速驅動的科技革命,並已喪失在世界經濟活動分類中的部分獨特優勢。香港正面臨總體性、結構性、分佈性三大範疇的問題。經濟增長放緩,提供中等收入的商業活動流於空洞化,社會不均加劇。筆者建議,通過將香港創建為優質工作之城,一併解決這些問題。

為香港創造更多優質工作的重要性至今未獲公認。筆者就此一議題的五大認識誤區作出澄清。歸根究柢,香港需要提高產業多樣性,擴充市場規模,並改善勞工流動情況。與其主張急劇轉變,本文建議逐步調整,以達致加強版金融業、升級版服務業,以及新興高科技業;此三大行業將成為本地創造大量優質工作的基礎。

筆者認為,若能紓緩短絀資源,改善整體經濟效率,化解經濟界外效應,則優質工作自會出現。帶領經濟轉型,促進職位向優質產業重新分配,香港特區政府責無旁貸。為協助政府履行其事,上文提出4項具體政策建議,包括人才策略、研發投資方面的公私營合作、與內地城市的策略性合作,以及借力高等教育界別。

 

參考文獻


Autor, David (2019) “Work of the Past, Work of the Future.” AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 109, pp. 1-32.

Hirschman, Albert (1958). The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Moretti, Enrico (2012). The New Geography of Jobs. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Rodrik, Dani, and Charles Sabel (2019) “Building a good jobs economy.” NBER Working Paper.