Success in Prediction Markets: Insight or Insider Information

A prediction market is a speculative market designed to generate forecasts. Profits and losses are tied to the outcome of a specific event (e.g. air strikes by the US and Israel on Iran) or a particular variable (e.g. whether the stock market will rise or fall tomorrow), and the contract’s value is ultimately determined by…


Professor Maurice Tse and Mr Clive Ho

11 March 2026

A prediction market is a speculative market designed to generate forecasts. Profits and losses are tied to the outcome of a specific event (e.g. air strikes by the US and Israel on Iran) or a particular variable (e.g. whether the stock market will rise or fall tomorrow), and the contract’s value is ultimately determined by the result. If the market estimates that Iran has a 75% chance of winning, the relevant contract would be priced at $75. If Iran wins, the contract would settle at $100, meaning that the event has occurred and the probability is now 100%.

The anonymous users of a prediction market platform can bet on all kinds of future events without having to pay any transaction fees as funding mainly comes from investors.

Outcome-based options products as a new “battleground”

With the increasing popularity of prediction markets, Polymarket and Kalshi reached a new high of combined trading volume of US$17.5 billion last month. Even traditional exchanges are considering developing similar functions. For example, Nasdaq has filed an application with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to launch binary structured products linked to its Nasdaq-100 Index, with trading prices fluctuating on the basis of the market’s assessment of the likelihood of a particular outcome occurring.

Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), the parent company of the New York Stock Exchange, announced last year that it would invest approximately US$2 billion in Polymarket. Cboe Global Markets, the parent company of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, is reportedly evaluating the relaunch of “all-or-nothing” option contracts.

Prediction market platforms such as Polymarket and Kalshi, which mostly fall under the commodity futures regulatory regime, are under the oversight of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Nasdaq’s filing of the above-mentioned application signals a change in the financial market’s attitude behind product innovation. If the application goes through, binary options will become a brand-new product for traditional securities exchanges. Prediction markets will probably be required to adhere to higher compliance standards.

It is worth noting that if Nasdaq’s new contract product is approved for inclusion under the SEC’s regulatory framework, it could mark a significant milestone by allowing prediction-based trading instruments to enter the traditional securities-market structure for the first time. As for the development from the commodity futures framework into the securities regime, it could also bring the jurisdictional boundary between the SEC and the CFTC back into focus. As recently pointed out by the SEC, prediction markets may give rise to overlapping jurisdiction; therefore, regulatory coordination is still necessary.

Constant spectre of insider trading

Media reports and discussions on social platforms suggest that insider trading is far from uncommon in the geopolitical market. In January 2026, a newly created account on a platform bet that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro would be ousted from office and made more than US$400,000 in just one day. The incident prompted a US Congressman to introduce the Public Integrity in Financial Prediction Markets Act of 2026, prohibiting federal officials from trading prediction-market contracts tied to government policy. But does the platform in question provide transparent information for users’ reference, or does it serve those with access to confidential information, enabling them to profit from trading information?

Prediction markets assign prices to events that have yet to occur. One important assumption is that the information entering the market is public, but announcements lack a systematic approach, e.g. poll results and corporate performance reports. If a prediction market involves participants holding information that others neither know nor have any way of knowing, it is tantamount to monetizing information asymmetry as a tradable commodity. So long as predictive accuracy relies on leaked confidential intelligence or internal timelines of the government, regardless of the public significance, the market ceases to be an information market and becomes a dark venue for trading in secrets.

Bordering on gambling and testing moral limits

Prediction markets have evolved from a marginal novelty into an independent financial ecosystem that both public and private financial institutions cannot afford to ignore. A Bloomberg survey last year showed that while traditional traders viewed that the financial products in prediction markets had long-term viability. It also highlighted the fine line between investments in these markets and gambling.

A few years ago, Polymarket was banned for operating without registration and was required to pay a US$1.4 million fine to the CFTC before being allowed to return to the US market recently. With the support of multiple Democrats of the House, Ritchie Torres introduced the bill above to ban government personnel from taking advantage of non-public information to trade on prediction markets. The reason for this move is that the timing of such wagers indicates that they are essentially insider trading rather than predictions based purely on publicly available information.

Despite being subject to legal challenges and political pressures, participation in prediction markets shows no sign of decline. In fact, they are now expanding from sports betting to other areas such as corporate earnings. Traditional gambling companies and hedge funds are deploying experts to trade on inefficient pricing.

Last year, Polymarket offered a contract on whether Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would wear a suit before July, attracting trading volume worth hundreds of millions of US dollars. Although Zelensky eventually showed up wearing a designer black jacket and trousers, the prediction market’s voting result indicated that he was not dressed in a suit. The reason was that a handful of major token holders had wagered heavily on the contrary outcome. Wielding sufficient voting power, they could push through a resolution in their favour.

Prediction markets, as the name suggests, are not about finding the truth but are intended to reach a settlement solution. What most participants believe to be the truth does not matter much. The only outcome that matters is the one ultimately determined by the system, and that process often involves conflicts over money and power. The higher the stakes, the greater the number of competing forces entering the fray, so controversy is hardly surprising.

Legal risks in grey areas

When participants bet on geopolitical events, secret military intelligence is typically known to a few people, leading to severe information asymmetry. The high level of anonymity preserved by market platforms can lure privileged insiders to conduct insider dealing in advance. Distinguishing illegal insider trading from unlawful prediction is never easy, demonstrating the need for tighter regulatory oversight of prediction markets.

Through expansion of the range of tradable assets, prediction markets make nearly anything tradable, thereby broadening the potential sources of valuable insider information. Suppose a secondary school runs a prediction market on this question: “Who will be crowned prom king?” Your friend, the most popular student in the entire grade, privately tells you that he will not be able to attend the prom. If you trade on the basis of this information, would that constitute insider trading? Legally, the issue hinges on whether the trade entails a fraudulent violation of a duty of trust. Any such duty would depend on the context in which the information was disclosed between you and your friend, rather than on any explicit duty to a company or any formal agreement. Accordingly, bringing an insider-trading claim under such circumstances would be extremely difficult.

Translation

預測市場靠眼光還是內幕

預測市場(prediction market)是以進行預測為目的而產生的一種投機市場。輸贏綁定某一特定事件(如美國和以色列空襲伊朗)或參數(如明日股市升跌),最終結果決定取得的金錢價值。假設市場認為伊朗戰勝的機會率是75%,此指數的價值就是$75,如伊朗真的勝出,指數價值便會升至$100,即有關事件已100%發生了。

預測市場平台的匿名用戶可對未來各種事件下注,不須繳付交易費,資金主要來自投資者。

基於結果的期權產品成新戰場

預測市場漸受追捧,Polymarket 與 Kalshi  在上月的總交投量創下175 億美元的新高位。傳統交易所也考慮發展相關功能,例如納斯達克已向美國證券交易委員會(SEC)提交申請,計劃推出與旗下納斯達克100 指數掛鉤的二元結構產品,交易價格將依市場對特定結果發生機會率的判斷而波動。

紐約證券交易所母公司洲際交易所(ICE)去年宣布對 Polymarket 投資約 20 億美元,芝加哥期權交易所(CBOE)母公司CBOE Global Markets 則傳出正評估重新推出「全有或全無」(all-or-nothing)期權合約。

Polymarket、Kalshi等預測市場平台,大多屬於商品期貨監管制度,由美國商品期貨交易委員會(CFTC)負責。納斯達克提出上述申請,在產品創新的背後意味着金融市場的態度轉變;若申請順利通過,二元期權將成為傳統證券交易所的嶄新產品,相信預測市場需遵照較高的合規標準。

不可不察的是,若納斯達克的新型合約產品獲准納入 SEC 的監管範圍,可能成為首次讓預測型交易工具進入傳統證券市場架構的重要里程碑。至於從商品期貨走進證券制度的發展,亦難免令 SEC 與 CFTC 之間的管轄界線再次成為關注核心。SEC 近期指出,預測市場或出現管轄權責重疊的情況,可見仍須協調監管。

內幕交易陰影揮之不去

從傳媒報導和社交平台討論或可推斷,在地緣政治市場中不乏內幕交易。今年 1 月,一個新開的平台帳戶押注委內瑞拉總統馬杜羅下台,短短1天之內,就賺了超過 40 萬美元。此一事件促使美國眾議員提出《2026 年金融預測市場公共誠信法案》,計劃禁止聯邦官員交易與政府政策掛鉤的預測市場合約。該平台提供的是透明資訊,讓用戶參考,抑或服務掌握機密的人,以便他們透過買賣資訊獲利?

預測市場為尚未發生的事件定價,其中有一重要假設:進入市場的資訊公開,但公告缺乏系統,如民調結果和公司業績報告。預測市場若涉及有人掌握他人不知且無法知道的資訊,等同將資訊不對稱貨幣商品化。只要包含洩露的機密情報或政府內部時間表而令預測準確,不論在任何具有公共意義的層面而言,就已不再是資訊市場,而是秘密交易的黑暗場所。

形同賭博衝擊道德底線

預測市場從邊緣的新奇事物,發展為公私營金融機構不能忽視的獨立融資生態系統。彭博市場去年的調查顯示,雖然傳統交易員認為預測市場上的金融產品具有持久生命力,但亦指出其中存在賭博與投資之間的模糊界線。

Polymarket 幾年前就曾因未經註冊營運而被禁,並須向 CFTC 支付140 萬美元罰款,直到最近才獲批准,重返美國市場。同時,眾議院內多名民主黨議員支持托雷斯(Ritchie Torres)所提出的法案,擬禁止政府內部人員利用非公開資訊在預測市場進行交易,皆因押注的時機反映實屬內幕交易,並非純粹按公開資訊作出預測。

儘管市場備受法律、政治壓力多重挑戰,參與熱度卻未見減少。事實上,預測市場正由體育博彩擴展至企業盈利數據等不同範圍,傳統賭博公司和對沖基金更正安排專家,透過低效定價進行交易。

去年,Polymarket 定出一個烏克蘭總統澤連斯基會否在 7 月前穿西裝的合約,吸引了數億美元的龐大交易量。最後澤連斯基身穿名牌黑色外套和長褲亮相,但預測市場的投票結果卻顯示他穿的不是西裝。背後原因,在於少數大型代幣持有者對相反結果押下巨額資金,由於他們掌握足夠投票權,足以推動一個對自己有利的決議。

顧名思義,預測市場無關於發現真相,其功能只在達成一個結算方案。大多數參與者相信什麼是事實毫不重要,最終有效的結果由系統認定,而當中每多牽涉資金、權力的鬥爭。利益愈大,涉及的各方勢力自然愈多,引發爭議就不足為奇。

灰色地帶的法律風險

參與者對地緣政治事件押注之際,軍事機密情報在公開前往往只有少數人知悉,因而造成嚴重資訊不對稱。市場平台容許高度匿名性,容易吸引特權知情者提前進行內幕交易。究竟是非法內幕交易還是合法預測,加以判斷殊非易事,反映預測市場在法規監管方面有待加強。

預測市場通過拓展交易的範圍,使幾乎任何事物都可交易,擴大了有價值內幕信息的來源。舉例來說,某中學設有「誰將成為畢業舞會舞王? 」的預測市場。你的朋友是全級最受歡迎的人,私下告知你無法參加舞會。 若你利用此信息進行交易,會否構成內幕交易?在法律層面,這繫於是否欺詐性違反承諾,任何此類承諾需按你和朋友之間的信息披露情境,而非基於對公司的明確義務或正式協議而定,以致提出內幕交易的訴訟障礙重重。

謝國生教授
港大經管學院金融學教學副教授、新界鄉議局當然執行委員

何敏淙
香港大學附屬學院經濟及商學學部助理學部主任、香港大學附屬學院講師

(本文同時於二零二六年三月十一日載於《信報》「龍虎山下」專欄)