The Power of Explaining Your No: How Investor Vote Rationales Drive Corporate Change

When institutional investors cast their votes against company directors, they increasingly do something that was once rare: they explain why. These “voting rationales” — brief written explanations accompanying dissenting votes — are emerging as a surprisingly effective tool for driving corporate governance reform, according to new research analyzing nearly 800,000 such disclosures.


When institutional investors cast their votes against company directors, they increasingly do something that was once rare: they explain why. These “voting rationales” — brief written explanations accompanying dissenting votes — are emerging as a surprisingly effective tool for driving corporate governance reform, according to new research analyzing nearly 800,000 such disclosures.

The study, conducted by professors at the University of Hong Kong, University of Bristol, and University of Toronto, reveals how a simple transparency mechanism is reshaping boardrooms across the globe. By analyzing voting patterns from 273 institutional investors managing over $37 trillion in assets between 2014 and 2022, the research demonstrates that when investors explain their opposition, companies listen — and change.

The Rise of Transparent Dissent

Voting rationales represent a fundamental shift in how institutional investors engage with companies. Historically, shareholders could vote for or against directors, but their reasoning remained opaque. Now, a growing number of investors voluntarily disclose why they oppose certain nominees, creating a direct communication channel between asset managers and corporate boards.

The numbers tell a compelling story. While investors provide rationales for only 1.7% of their supportive votes, they explain their opposition 14.5% of the time. This disparity suggests that rationales serve primarily as warning signals, flagging specific governance concerns that demand attention.

The practice is becoming widespread across markets. Some 84% of companies in the study received at least one voting rationale during the research period, indicating that this form of engagement extends far beyond a handful of activist investors to encompass mainstream institutional shareholders.

Independence and Diversity Drive Opposition

The research reveals clear patterns in what troubles institutional investors most. Lack of board independence tops the list, cited in 21% of all rationales for voting against directors. This finding reinforces decades of corporate governance research emphasizing the importance of independent oversight of management.

Board diversity emerges as the second-most common concern, appearing in nearly 18% of rationales. Notably, diversity concerns were prominent even before major asset managers like BlackRock and State Street launched high-profile campaigns on the issue in 2017, suggesting grassroots investor concern preceded the headline-grabbing initiatives.

Other frequent rationales include concerns about director tenure, board busyness (directors serving on too many boards simultaneously), and issues around CEO-chairman duality. Interestingly, rationales rarely mention directors’ advisory or monitoring roles , the core functions of board service , nor do they mention valuation, the most important outcome of board’s actions,  suggesting investors focus more on structural governance issues than operational oversight.

Genuine Governance Concerns

The research demonstrates that voting rationales reflect authentic investor concerns rather than superficial posturing. There is strong alignment between the rationales investors provide and companies’ actual board characteristics. Firms receiving diversity-related rationales typically have less diverse boards, while those flagged for tenure concerns feature directors with longer service periods. This correlation indicates investors are identifying genuine governance problems rather than engaging in “rationale washing.”

Additionally, analysis of proxy advisor recommendations reveals that advisors like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis differ in the relative importance they assign to various governance issues compared to institutional investors’ rationales, suggesting many institutional investors exercise independent judgment in their voting decisions.

Corporate Response and Market Impact

Importantly, the research demonstrates that voting rationales drive real corporate change. Companies receiving high dissent accompanied by specific rationales are significantly more likely to address the flagged concerns in the following year. For example, firms criticized for lack of board diversity increased female representation, while those flagged for tenure or busyness issues made corresponding adjustments.

The feedback loop appears to work both ways. Companies that respond to rationale-flagged concerns see reduced dissenting votes in subsequent years, suggesting that addressing investor concerns improves shareholder support. This dynamic creates a powerful incentive for boards to take voting rationales seriously.

Crucially, the research shows that dissent alone is insufficient to drive change — companies respond in a more pronounced way when explicit rationales accompany high opposition votes. This finding underscores the unique value of explained dissent over silent opposition.

A Low-Cost Governance Tool

The implications extend beyond individual companies to the broader corporate governance ecosystem. Voting rationales offer institutional investors a cost-effective way to engage with portfolio companies, particularly important for asset managers holding stakes across thousands of firms. Traditional engagement through direct dialogue requires significant resources and may not be feasible for smaller holdings, or for institutions who hold 100s or 1,000s of different firms.

The transparency inherent in public rationales also creates market-wide benefits. Other investors can observe which governance issues their peers prioritize, potentially influencing broader voting patterns. Companies can benchmark their governance practices against the concerns raised at similar firms, enabling proactive improvements.

Future of Shareholder Engagement

The research suggests voting rationales represent just the beginning of a broader trend toward transparency in institutional investor decision-making. As asset managers face increasing pressure to demonstrate active stewardship of client capital, explained voting may become standard practice rather than voluntary disclosure.

The findings also highlight potential areas for further development. While rationales for votes against directors are detailed and substantive, explanations for supportive votes remain generic and uninformative. Greater transparency around positive governance features could provide companies with clearer guidance on best practices.

Conclusion

The emergence of voting rationales marks a significant evolution in corporate governance. By providing a simple, transparent mechanism for communicating shareholder priorities, these explanations are proving more influential than their modest format might suggest. Companies are listening, boards are changing, and investors are finding their voice in corporate governance debates.

As institutional ownership continues to concentrate and stewardship expectations rise, voting rationales offer a scalable solution to the challenge of meaningful shareholder engagement. The research demonstrates that sometimes the most powerful corporate governance tool is not a complex regulation or costly intervention, but simply explaining why you said no.

For companies, the message is clear: in an era of transparent investing, every vote tells a story — and boards ignore those stories at their peril.

Academic paper: Voting Rationales

Professor Roni Michaely
University of Hong Kong

Professor Silvina Rubio
University of Bristol

Professor Irene Yi
University of Toronto

Translation

解釋反對票:機構投資者藉助投票理由推動公司治理改革


過去,機構投資者在對企業董事投下反對票時,極少公開說明反對的具體原因。 而如今,這種情況正在改變。 附在反對票上的簡短書面說明——正成為推動公司治理改革的利器。

香港大學、布裡斯托大學和多倫多大學的學者分析了2014至2022年間273家機構投資者(合計管理資產超過37萬億美元)披露的近80萬條投票記錄,發現:當投資者明確解釋反對理由時,企業更願意傾聽,並據此調整治理策略。 這一簡單而透明的機制,正在悄然改變全球董事會的運作方式。

越來越透明的反對票


投票理由公開化的興起,標誌著機構投資者與企業互動方式的深刻轉變。 過去,股東雖然可以投下贊成或反對票,但其背後的判斷邏輯往往不為人知。 如今,越來越多機構投資者主動披露反對某位董事的具體原因,為董事會與投資者之間搭建起更加直接透明的溝通管道。

數據反映出這一趨勢:支援票中,僅有1.7%附帶說明; 而在反對票中,這一比例高達14.5%。 這表明,投票理由常作為一種「預警信號」 提示企業存在需要關注的治理問題。

這一做法正在全球資本市場快速普及。 研究顯示,在樣本期內,約84%的企業至少收到過一次附帶理由的反對票,說明這已不再是激進投資者的專利,而是主流機構投資者廣泛採用的參與方式。

反對票背後的主要關切:獨立性與多元化


研究發現,機構投資者最常提出的反對理由是董事會缺乏獨立性,佔比達21%。 這進一步印證了獨立董事在公司治理中至關重要的角色。

緊隨其後的是董事會多元化問題,佔比近18%。 值得注意的是,投資者對多元化的關注早於2017年貝萊德(BlackRock)和道富集團(State Street)等大型機構的倡議,這表明多元化改革的動力主要來自機構投資者本身,而非僅憑大型資產管理機構推動。

此外,投資者還常因董事任期過長、兼職過多(即同時擔任多家企業的董事)以及董事長兼任首席執行官等問題表達不滿。 有趣的是,投票理由中極少涉及董事應盡的核心職能,例如戰略監督或企業估值等議題,這表明機構投資者當前更關注的是董事會的結構,而非企業運營或財務表現。

投票理由是否表達真實關切?


研究顯示,機構投資者的反對理由並非流於形式,而是真實的反映了其對公司治理的關注。 理由內容與董事會的實際情況高度契合:例如,被批評缺乏多元化的企業,確實董事會構成更為單一; 而被指出董事任期過長的企業,實際情況也確如其言。 這種相關性顯示,機構投資者並非“理由漂洗”,而是在識別真實的治理風險。

此外,機構投資者的關注重點與代理顧問(如ISS和Glass Lewis)在不少方面存在差異,說明許多機構並非簡單照搬建議,而是在獨立判斷基礎上作出投票決策。

企業是否回應?


研究進一步發現,投票理由不僅傳達態度,也能推動企業行為調整。 那些在股東大會上遭遇高比例反對票且附有明確理由的企業,往往會在隨後一年對相關問題作出積極回應。 例如,被批評董事會多元化不足的企業,通常會提升女性董事的比例; 而在董事任期或兼職問題上受到質疑的企業,也更傾向於作出調整。

反饋機制是雙向的。 那些積極回應投票理由的企業,在後續年度收到的反對票比例通常會下降,表明回應投資者關切有助於提升股東支援,也為董事會認真對待投票理由提供了實際激勵。

但研究也發現,僅有反對票本身並不足以促成改變。 只有當反對票伴隨著明確理由時,企業才更可能採取行動。 這凸顯了「解釋性反對」相較「沉默反對」更具治理效力。

一種低成本治理參與方式


投票理由的意義遠不止於影響個別企業,它也可能改變公司治理的整體生態。 對持倉覆蓋數千家企業的大型資產管理機構而言,披露投票理由是一種低成本、可持續的參與方式。 相比之下,直接對話或參與董事會則成本更高,難以廣泛適用。

此外,公開披露的投票理由還能帶來更廣泛的市場影響。 其他投資者可據此識別重要治理議題,調整自身投票決策; 企業亦可藉助同行的投票理由,對比自身實踐,發現潛在問題,提前改進。

股東參與的新趨勢


投票理由的披露或許只是機構投資者提高治理透明度的第一步。 隨著受託責任壓力不斷上升,資產管理機構需要向客戶證明其積极參與治理事務,未來“解釋性投票”有望從個別實踐發展為行業規範。

研究還指出,該機制的下一個發展方向是提升對“支援票”的解釋品質。 目前,大多數支援票的理由較為範本化,缺乏實質資訊。 若能在支援票中更明確地展示公司治理的亮點,將有助於塑造最佳實踐,並增強企業間的治理學習與競爭。

結語


投票理由“的興起,標誌著公司治理進入一個更加透明、更加重視股東互動的新階段。 作為一種簡潔而高效的溝通機制,它不僅促使企業傾聽股東聲音,也正在重塑董事會與投資者之間的關係。

隨著機構持股比例持續上升,市場對其治理責任的期望也水漲船高。 投票理由為實現高效且有意義的股東參與提供了一種可擴展的解決方案。 正如研究所示,最具影響力的治理工具,往往不是複雜的監管規則或高成本的干預措施,而是一句清晰的解釋:「我為何說不」。

對企業而言,這是一種提醒:在投資日益透明的時代,每一張股東投票,都可能承載著不容忽視的治理信號。

 

本文作者為港大經管學院副院長、香港大學賽馬會環球企業可持續發展研究所聯席所長及金融學教授Roni Michaely教授、布裡斯托大學Silvina Rubio教授及多倫多大學Irene Yi教授。 文章基於他們近期合作的論文《Voting Rationales》。

論文原文連結:https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4521854